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ABSTRACT
In the scientific study of the emotions the goal is to find natural kinds. That is, to find
categories about which interesting scientific generalizations and predictions can be formed. Core
affect is dimensional approach to the emotions which claims that emotions emerge from the
more basic psychological processes of valence (pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal
(activation/deactivation). Lisa Feldman Barrett (2006b) has recently argued that the discrete
emotion approach has failed to find natural kinds and thus should be dismissed as a failed
paradigm. She offers core affect as an alternative theory that will better capture natural kinds in
emotionally salient phenomena. In this thesis I evaluate Barrett’s claim on the basis of a
philosophically robust understanding of natural kinds and a careful assessment of the empirical
evidence. I argue that while core affect is not a natural kind, subsets of core affect space may be
natural kinds.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Emotions are a central part of life. Emotional reactions represent the loss or gain of things
we value, such as the thrill of victory or the disappointment of failure or grief at the loss of a
parent. Emotions have long been thought of as passions defined in opposition to rationality (e.g.
Plato Republic. 439d). At the same time emotions have also been proposed to explain a wide
variety of phenomena that are important to rationality, such as memory (e.g. Damasio 1994).
Emotions draw our attention to objects and we tend to have prominent memories about
emotionally salient events. Emotions are seen as causes of diverse behaviors and psychological
processes, as well as psychological disorders, such as anxiety disorders. Emotions are thus
important psychological processes that are in need of explanation. Additionally, some argue that
a scientific understanding of emotions is integral to any science of the mind or any explanation
of consciousness (e.g. Barrett 2006b; Russell 2003; Chalmers 1999).
In recent years, there has been a significant amount of interest in the nature of the
emotions from researchers in a wide variety of disciplines. Some of these include philosophers
(e.g. Nussbaum 2001; Griffiths 1997; Prinz 2004b; Charland 2005), neuroscientists (e.g.
Damasio 1999; Panksepp 1998), psychologists (e.g. Fridja 1986; Ekman 1999a), and more
generally cognitive scientists (e.g. LeDoux 1996; Bradley and Lang 2000). One would expect
that the result of this explosion of theoretical interest would be an accumulating body of
knowledge and consensus over the nature of the emotions, but that has not been the case. Instead,
the study of emotion has been hampered by disagreements about what the emotions are, how best
to study them, and how best to interpret the existing empirical evidence.
Recently Lisa Feldman Barrett has argued that emotion theory has been hindered not so
much by disagreement, but by the wide acceptance of the notion that discrete emotions, such as
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anger, fear, and sadness, are natural kinds (2006b).1 Natural kinds are the holy grail of scientific
investigation because they allow scientists to form generalizations and predictions about the
given category. But Barrett claims that the empirical evidence does not warrant the assumption
that the discrete emotions are categories that are apt for generalizations and predictions. Instead
she argues that the scientific study of emotion should focus on more fundamental processes,
rather than these broad categories. Barrett presents core affect as a theory that focuses on these
fundamental processes. Core affect is a dimensional, neuropsychological category corresponding
to levels of valence (pleasant /unpleasant) and arousal (activation /deactivation). Core affect
theorists, such as Lisa Feldman Barrett and James A. Russell claim that emotions emerge from
this neuropsychological category and Barrett further argues that “the empirical case supporting
the hypothesis that core affect is a natural kind is suggestive” (2006b, 48).2
In this paper I will evaluate the empirical case for Barrett’s hypothesis on the basis of a
more philosophical understanding of natural kinds and a careful assessment of the evidence. Paul
Griffiths has pointed out that “questions about the nature of the emotions cannot be answered in
the armchair alone but must be sought in part by empirical investigation of emotional
phenomena” (1997, 1). I will do just that. I will argue that the empirical evidence supports what
Carl Craver (2004) has called “kind splitting.” 3 In other words, splitting the proposed kind (core
affect) is more likely to yield the kinds about which inductive generalizations and predictions can

1

Emotion terms that refer to linguistic forms will be indicated by quotations, while emotion categories or the
discrete emotions will be indicated by italics. For example, “joy” refers to the word itself as used by the folk and joy
refers to the discrete emotion.
2
Being a good scientist, Barrett emphasizes that “the crucial experiments have yet to be done” and that we should
withhold judgment until further empirical evidence is collected (48).
3
Craver defines kind splitting as “a common (but rarely explicit) methodological assumption in neuroscience and
elsewhere that discovering a kind to be dissociably realized [cases where a proposed kind is found to be realized by
more than one distinct and independent realizer] mandates splitting the kind into as many as there are dissociable
realizers” (960). The realizers vary according to the explanatory role they play in the theory. In the case of
neuroscience and, arguably, cognitive science the realizers are often thought of as brain areas and/or scientifically
relevant properties.
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be formed. I will attempt to show that four potential candidates for natural kindhood can be
located in subsets of the core affective category. Natural kinds are the primary subject of
scientific research as well as much philosophical analysis of the emotions. Therefore, the
discovery of four potential natural kinds in the core affective category contributes to future
scientific research and philosophical analysis of the emotions.
In chapter two, I will discuss the major theoretical frameworks at play in current emotion
theory, introduce core affect theory, and examine whether or not the dimensions of valence and
arousal are well-defined. In chapter three, I will begin by explaining Richard Boyd’s theory of
natural kinds (1991; 1999), which Barrett assumes for her analysis (2006b). I will then
reconstruct Barrett’s argument that discrete emotions are not natural kinds and examine her
argument in favor of the natural kind status of core affect. In chapter four I will assess the
evidence to see if, in fact, core affect is a natural kind. I will argue, contra Barrett, that the
evidence in favor of core affect being a natural kind is not suggestive. This being said, there may
be a sense in which four subsets of the broad core affective category may be natural kinds. I will
conclude with what I think core affect can add to emotion theory and a general lesson for
emotion theorists looking for natural kinds: splitting proposed kinds is the best avenue for
discovering natural kinds.
CHAPTER 2: CORE AFFECT AND ITS HISTORICAL ROOTS
J. Russell defines core affect as “a neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible
as a simple nonreflective feeling that is an integral blend of hedonic (pleasure-displeasure) and
arousal (sleepy-activated) values” (2003, 147). He argues that valence and arousal have played a
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fundamental role in theories of emotion, going back to the beginning of psychology.4 Core affect
is proposed as an alternate theoretical paradigm to the dominant paradigm in current emotion
theory, the discrete emotion approach. Since core affect is hailed by Barrett and Russell as a
better theory of the emotions, it is important to begin by discussing what a good theory of the
emotions should look like.
Roughly speaking, a good theory of the emotions should have explanatory and predictive
power. It should tell us why a given emotion is present, predict when an emotion will be present,
and do so better than alternative theories. The theory should be applicable to emotions in all
individuals that experience them and apply to all cultures in which emotions are exhibited. In this
chapter, I will begin with a general outline of the theoretical frameworks in emotion theory and
explain core affect theory in more detail. This will prepare us to compare and contrast different
approaches to the study of emotions in terms of their explanatory and predictive power.
2.1- Theoretical Frameworks in Emotion Theory
A fundamental question in emotion theory is whether emotions are best studied as broad
dimensions or as discrete units (such as the surprise unit, the sadness unit, etc.). The former
approach finds its origins in Wilhelm Wundt (1873; 1897), while the latter finds its origins in
William James (1884).5 Ever since, there has been a tension between dimensional and discrete
approaches over which theoretical framework best captures the emotions.6 Core affect theorists
adopt a dimensional framework and claim that their approach is scientifically more fruitful than
the discrete emotions framework. Discrete emotion theorists disagree and argue that emotions

4

According to Russell, early psychologists like Wilhem Wundt, Carl Stumpf, and Edward Bradford Titchner all
posited something similar to core affect. In particular Wundt “identified dimensions of pleasant-unpleasant, tensionrelaxation, and excitement-calm as the basis of feeling and emotion” (Russell 2003, 153).
5
Wundt and James are considered the fathers of modern psychology.
6
See Izard and Azkerman (2000) for a discussion of the historical debate and tensions that have arisen between
dimensional and discrete emotion theorists.
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should be studied as discrete units. In what follows I will briefly describe these two approaches
in their contemporary forms.
The discrete emotions approach starts with folk terms for the emotions, such as
“happiness,” “disgust,” “contempt,” and so on, and attempts to construct theories about what the
folk emotion terms refer to in the world. Discrete emotion theorists claim that there are a small
number of folk emotions (for example, “fear,” “anger,” “joy,” and “sadness”) that can be
scientifically and theoretically identified and distinguished from one another. The underlying
assumption is that some folk emotion terms refer to real distinctions in the world, or at least they
partially refer to them, and can be precisified so as to be useful in scientific theories.7 For
example, the folk term “sadness” refers to a discrete emotion, sadness, because there are unique
properties associated with it, such as distinct contractions of facial muscles and signature bodily
responses. Moreover, the instantiation of these properties may be due to a common cause,
assumed to be in the brain, such as activity in the subcallosal cingulate. According to this
approach, the discrete emotions are the proper focus of scientific studies.
Discrete emotion theorists argue over the number of discrete emotions and postulate
different theories about how to theoretically and scientifically identify these emotions. Three
examples of discrete emotion theories are cognitivism (e.g. Arnold, 1960; Solomon, 2004), neoJamesianism (e.g. Damasio, 1999; Prinz 2004c), and basic emotions or affect program theory
(e.g. Ekman, 1999a; Griffiths, 1997). It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to elaborate on
the nuances of these theories. What follows is a brief sketch of these three discrete emotion
theories. The goal is to provide the reader with a preliminary understanding of the discrete
emotion approach.
7

It is important to keep in mind that discrete emotions do not equate to folk emotion terms. The discrete emotion
approach begins with these terms, but may need to eliminate certain properties associated with them in order to find
a precise scientific term.
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Cognitivism claims that discrete emotions can be theoretically and scientifically
identified and distinguished from each other by the way an object is judged or appraised. The
basic slogan of the research program is: “Emotions are appraisals or value judgments”
(Nussbaum 2001, 4). The psychologist Magda Arnold, for instance, claimed that the differences
between discrete emotions can be explained by an organism’s direct, intuitive, and immediate
appraisal of environmental changes that affect their well-being (1960).8 For example, fear may
be identified by the appraisal that an object, like a tiger, is dangerous. Grief may be identified by
the appraisal that an important object, like a spouse, has been lost, and anger by the appraisal
that someone has been mistreated.
Neo-Jamesianism is a second example of a discrete emotion theory. Neo-Jamesians argue
that discrete emotions are scientifically and theoretically identified and distinguished by complex
changes in the body in reaction to appraisals of emotionally relevant stimuli. According to Jesse
Prinz, “emotions are perceptions (conscious or unconscious) of patterned changes in the body
(construed inclusively)” (2004c, 45). These bodily changes are correlated with activations in
brain areas associated with bodily perception, such as the somatosensory cortex.9 For example,
disgust may be identified by the sensation that one’s “skin is crawling” and nausea. Fear may be
identified by a rise in body temperature, resulting in sweating, and the “freezing” of one’s limbs,
and anger may be identified by an increase in heart rate and contractions in the brow area.

8

Arnold argued that every organism is constantly appraising the environment around them in order to identify things
that are helpful or harmful, easy or hard to avoid or approach, and which objects are present or absent. However,
organisms do differ in their level and ability of appraisal. While Arnold’s theory posited discrete emotions as the
entities that best explain emotional phenomena, many of her intellectual predecessors posited dimensions instead.
Most current appraisal theories, at least in the natural sciences, assume a dimensional approach, although some, such
as Lazarus (1991), have argued for a hybrid theory. See Ellsworth and Scherer (2003) for a detailed discussion of
appraisal theories.
9
The somatosensory cortex is an area of the brain that receives information about general sensations, such as touch,
pain, pressure, temperature, and proprioception (the sensation of joint and muscle position).
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A third influential discrete emotion theory is affect program theory (or basic emotions
theory), arguably the dominant non-dimensional approach in contemporary emotion theory. The
fundamental claim is that discrete emotions are distinguished and identified by a set of complex
responses to the emoter’s environment that are modular (Fodor, 1983)10 and evolutionarily
determined.11 According to Ekman, “the primary function of emotion is to mobilize the organism
to deal quickly with important interpersonal encounters, prepared to do so by what types of
activity have been adaptive in the past [as a species and as individuals]” (1999b, 46). A few of
the responses associated with the discrete emotions by affect program theorists are pan-culturally
recognized facial expressions, distinctive physiology, quick onset, and presence in non-humans,
such as primates.12 Ekman has argued that at least fear, anger, sadness, disgust, joy, and surprise
are affect programs or basic emotions in this sense. For example, surprise may be identified by a
distinct facial expression that involves the raising of the eyebrows, increased heart rate, and rapid
onset, and that these responses are present in non-humans.
What these three discrete emotion theories share are two assumptions about how
scientists should study the emotions. First, the assumption that emotions are best captured in
terms of discrete units (e.g. the fear unit, the anger unit, and so on) and second, the assumption
that folk terms are the natural starting point for any scientific investigation of the emotions. What
differentiates these theories, on the other hand, is how to identify scientifically fruitful discrete
10

A module on Fodor’s account is “domain specific, innately specified, hardwired, autonomous, and not assembled”
(1983, 37). One of the main points of a modular is that they are informationally encapsulated (i.e. the module cannot
access any mental process or information outside of itself, only information in the specific module can be used, and
this information can contradict information stored in other modules). Griffiths has argued that this is the most
important aspect of the basic emotion theory (1997).
11
There are a variety of different versions of the basic emotion theory (e.g. Ekman, 1999b; Fridja, 1986; Izard,
1977; Plutchik, 1980; Panksepp, 1998), but most agree with this fundamental claim. These accounts diverge on
issues such as the number of basic emotions and which of the responses are needed to pick out particular basic
emotions. See Ortony and Turner (1990) for a detailed discussion of the differences between these theories. I will
focus on Ekman’s version here because, arguably, he was the first to propose it and provide empirical support for it
(1971; 1992; Ekman et al., 1983).
12
For a list of the characteristic responses see table 3.1 in Ekman (1999b, 56).
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emotions. For example, cognitivists claim that fear is identified by the judgment that an object is
dangerous. Neo-Jamesians claim that fear should be identified by the perception of complex
bodily changes, such as sweat and increased heart rate. Affect program theorists or basic emotion
theorists claim that fear should be identified by a complex set of reactions to the emoter’s
environment that are evolutionarily determined, such as involuntary physiological reactions, the
production of a suite of distinct facial expressions, characteristic behavioral responses, and so on.
This completes my introduction of the discrete emotions approaches in emotion theory. Let us
now turn to the dimensional approach, of which core affect theory is the most prominent
example.
In the current scientific study of emotions, dimensional theorists believe that we should
focus on the underlying constituents of the discrete emotions. All dimensional theories share one
assumption, namely that all discrete emotions share more basic psychological properties. It is
argued that emotions emerge from these more basic properties and that focusing on these
properties is scientifically more fruitful than focusing on discrete emotions. According to
dimensional theorists, discrete emotion categories do not represent independent phenomena to be
explained and identified one by one. Rather, emotion categories are higher-order phenomena
which emerge from changes along continuous dimensions of lower-order properties. These
properties are commonly defined by two dimensions, although a dimensional theory can posit as
many dimensions as is needed in order to achieve explanatory and predictive power. Core affect
posits valence and arousal as the key dimensions. In the next section I will elaborate on these.
2.2- Core Affect Introduced
As I previously mentioned, core affect is a neuropsychological category corresponding to
combinations of valence and arousal levels. Valence is broadly understood as hedonic tone
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(positive/negative or pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal is broadly understood as
activation/deactivation of the mind and body. For example, “joy” is positively valenced and
highly arousing and “disgust” is negatively valenced and mildly arousing. Core affect is not just
a theory about the emotions, but about all affective states.13 As Russell (2003, 146) puts it:
The scope of the proposed framework is broader than emotion (including states such as
comfort, serenity, drowsiness, and lethargy). Gone is the assumption that all events called
emotion or fear or anger can be accounted for in the same way. These concepts are not
abandoned but are put in their proper place as folk rather than scientific concepts, and
their role limited to whatever role folk concepts actually play in emotion (and in
perception of emotion in others).14
Core affect theorists claim that emotions “emerge from” affective states and that affective states
are best described as combinations of valence and arousal values (Barrett 2007a). These states of
valence and arousal endow the emoters with a kind of “core knowledge about whether objects or
events are helpful or harmful, rewarding or threatening, calling for acceptance or rejection”
(Barrett 2007a, 377). Here is Barrett’s (2007a, 377) definition of core affect:
Information about the external world… indicates whether an object or situation is
helpful or harmful, rewarding or threatening, requiring approach or withdrawal.
With awareness, core affect is experienced as feelings of pleasure or displeasure
that are to some extent arousing or quieting.
The clearest way to conceive of the core affective category is in terms of the so-called
“core affect circumplex.” Broadly speaking, a circumplex is a visual representation of certain
aspects of a theoretically defined psychological space, aiming to capture certain psychological
13

Nico H. Fridja (2000) gives the best explanation of the term “affective” that I have seen. He explains that salient
events (events associated with strong feelings) often intrude upon goal-directed behavior and thought and at times
even interrupt it. Salient events can also elicit unplanned thought and behavior. These sort of salient feelings or
events “affect” the person. According to Fridja, the predecessors to the notion of affect are the Greek pathema, the
Latin affectus, and the early French and English “passion.” These terms all indicate a form of behavior that is in
some sense passive, which differs from “action,” and the terms contrast affect and passion. Salient events intrude
upon goal-directed behavior and may elicit desires, thoughts, plans, and behaviors that persist over time. Some of
these behaviors may even be performed regardless of the cost, moral objections, and external obstacles. According
to Fridja, this is the more modern sense of passion- the behaviors, desires, and thoughts that suggest urges with
considerable force. Although, core affect is a broad category that encompasses all affective states, in this paper I will
typically focus on the emotions. The generality of core affect will be discussed where relevant.
14
Emphasis in original.
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phenomena. In the case of core affect, the psychological space is represented by two axes:
valence and arousal. Valence is plotted along the horizontal axis and arousal is plotted along the
vertical axis. Below is the core affect circumplex:

:

In order to map the affective space portrayed above, core affect theorists ask individuals to make
judgments about the relationships between valence and arousal for various affective terms using
surveys and self-reports. For instance, they ask subjects a number of questions about the levels of
valence and arousal for terms like “fatigued,” “contented,” “happy,” and “stressed” and then
chart how individuals group the concepts of valence and arousal. Just to give an example,
subjects consistently rate “depressed” and “fatigued” as low activation and negative valence. The
theorists then take the information from the surveys and using statistical techniques form the
circumplex and plot the affective space (see Barrett 1996). I will return to the evidence that
supports the core affective circumplex in section 3.3.1.2.
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Since core affect theorists claim that emotions emerge from these more basic
psychological states of valence and arousal, the prototypical emotions are supposed to map onto
the circumplex, as shown above. For example, “fear” and “anger” are commonly rated as both
being highly arousing and negatively valenced, so they will be placed in the top left quadrant.
“Happiness” is commonly rated as both being positively valenced and highly arousing, so it is
placed in the top right quadrant. It is important to keep the circumplex in mind as it is a visual
representation of the core affect category. Since core affect is defined as combinations of valence
and arousal, it is important to figure out what core affect theorists mean by these terms. This is
the task for the next section.

2.3- Are Valence and Arousal Well-Defined?
As it turns out, there are multiple definitions put forth for both valence and arousal by
core affect theorists, some of which may not be compatible with each other. I do not argue that
these definitions cannot be made compatible, but rather suggest that doing so would require
clarifications of deep methodological issues. A thorough discussion of this issue, however, lies
outside the scope of this thesis. What I need is a clear, yet admittedly provisional understanding
of valence and arousal, which I will then adopt in the subsequent chapters.
The first dimension I will examine is arousal, which is characterized as a continuum from
a state of maximal activation to a state of maximal deactivation (visually represented by the
vertical axis of the circumplex). “Activation is a general mobilization in preparation for vigorous
action” and “the feeling [of arousal] is one’s sense of mobilization and energy” (Russell 2003,
150 and 148). The intuition behind positing arousal as a dimension is that all emotions seem to
vary in arousal. For example, “anger” can range from mild irritation (low arousal) to “rage”
(high arousal). It is hard to imagine an emotion that does not vary in arousal and so it appears
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that arousal is central to emotion. Additionally, arousal appears to be an integral component in
explaining an emoter’s behavioral reactions. Organisms appear to mobilize resources for actions
according to the level of intensity of an occurent emotion. “Rage” mobilizes a high amount of
energy so that an individual is ready to fight and refocuses the subject’s attention almost
exclusively on the eliciting stimuli. Mild irritation, on the other hand, mobilizes a low amount of
energy that does not necessarily prepare an individual to fight, and does not refocus attention
exclusively.
Arousal can be explained in at least two ways, as physiological arousal and felt arousal.
Physiological arousal essentially involves the body and is measured by reactions in the
autonomic nervous system.15 The body is physiologically aroused when running, for example,
and deactivated when sleeping. Felt arousal is similar, but does not necessarily involve the body
although it often does. A person may feel aroused when they are anxious, but that feeling may or
may not correspond to something that can be physically measured.
Barrett seems to combine these two definitions and defines arousal as “feeling as if the
mind or body is active, as in aroused, attentive, or wound-up, versus feeling that the mind or
body is still, as in quiet, still, or sleepy. Felt activation is typically related to, but does not have a
one-to-one correspondence with, actual physiologic activity” (2007a, 379).16 Clearly one
component of what is “felt” in felt arousal is the bodily changes involved in physiological
arousal, but “felt” also indicates feelings that the mind is aroused. To summarize, the dimension

15

The autonomic nervous system consists of two contrasting neuron pathways: the parasympathetic (controls the
body when at rest) and the sympathetic (controls the body in “flight-or-fight” situations). The autonomic nervous
system is not under voluntary control (and so is thought to be a good measure of the effects of the emotions since it
eliminates socially learned reactions), is controlled by the hypothalamus, and effects contractions of smooth muscles
and glands. Measurements of the autonomic nervous system include heart rate, blood pressure and flow, respiration,
and movement of the eyes. The scientific assumption is that correlating autonomic nervous system reactions with
categories provides evidence for an underlying causal mechanism. See Barrett 2006b for more on this assumption.
16
Emphasis added.
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of arousal is defied both as felt arousal and physiological arousal with an emphasis placed on felt
arousal.
There are numerous philosophical and scientific problems with defining arousal in terms
of felt arousal. On the scientific side, it is difficult to see how a scientist would measure felt
arousal. According to Barrett this can be accomplished through “cross-sectional studies
examining how…participants self-report their experiences using common… emotion words [and
these self-reports] often give evidence of arousal-based content” (2007a, 379). Barrett has argued
that self-reports do tell us about the phenomenal experience of subjects and has codified a
method to access the phenomenological feel of core affect (1996; 1997; 2004a; 2007a). But it is
questionable whether self-reports can capture the phenomenology of subjective experience. It is
beyond the scope of the present thesis to discuss the issue in detail, but one of the central
objections to such a method is that self-reports essentially involve introspection on the part of the
subject, which may alter the phenomena in question.17 In the subsequent chapters I will adopt the
physiological notion of arousal and leave behind these problematic claims about felt arousal. I
will return to my provisional notion of arousal at the end of this section.
The second dimension of core affect is valence. Valence is characterized as a continuum
from a state of maximal pleasantness to a state of maximal unpleasantness (visually represented
by the horizontal axis of the circumplex). “Pleasure-displeasure (or valence) is a dimension of
experience that refers to hedonic tone” (Barrett 1999b, 10). Intuitively all emotions seem to be
either pleasant or unpleasant. For example, “fear” seems unpleasant whereas “joy” seems
pleasant and “sadness” seems unpleasant whereas “happiness” seems pleasant.

17

For a more detailed philosophical discussion of the problems and virtues of self-reports see Chalmers 1998 and
2004.
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The following is Barrett’s more detailed explanation of valence: “the valenced aspect of
core affect has been called many things- hedonic tone, utility, good-bad, mood, pleasure-pain,
approach-withdrawal, rewarding-punishing, appetitive-aversive, positive-negative- but the
similarity is clear” (2006d, 40). Philosophers have argued that the similarities are not clear and
that the term “valence” is ambiguous (e.g. Prinz, 2004a; Charland, 2005). To explore this alleged
ambiguity I will look at two of these notions: positive-negative and approach-withdrawal. The
positive-negative notion of valence is often explained in terms of pleasant and unpleasant
feelings. For example, “joy” is a positive emotion in which pleasant feelings are involved and
“fear” is a negative emotion in which unpleasant feelings are involved. On the other hand, the
approach-withdrawal notion of valence is often explained in terms of approach and withdrawal
behaviors. For example, “love” elicits the tendency to approach the person that invokes the
positive emotion and “disgust” elicits the tendency to withdrawal or stay away from the person
who invokes the negative emotion. The first notion fundamentally involves a feeling aspect,
while the second can be explained in terms of behaviors.
Defining valence as fundamentally involving feelings or behaviors radically changes the
types of experiments that can be done to study valence and the scope of the conclusions that can
be drawn. The feeling aspect limits the subjects involved in the experiment to those who possess
language, while defining valence in terms of behaviors widens the range of potential
experimental subjects and thus the conclusions that can be drawn. For example, if a researcher
uses the notion of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, then the method will, in all likelihood, be to
use self-reports to try and access these feelings. This methodology excludes infants and nonhumans. On the other hand, if a researcher uses the notion of approach-withdrawal, then a
number of different methods could be used and some methods will be unacceptable if used on
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humans. For example, cocaine could be used to elicit approach behaviors and electric shocks to
elicit withdrawal behaviors. In this case valence includes non-humans and there may be
interesting homologous structures of the mammalian brain involved in valence. So how the
experiment is conducted and the scope of the conclusions are affected by the notion of valence
that is adopted.18 Although I will use the terms “positive valence” and “negative valence” in
subsequent chapters, I will not adopt the feeling notion of valence. For the purposes of this
thesis, “valence” is to be understood in the behavior sense described above.
To summarize, both valence and arousal are mongrel concepts. I have argued that arousal
is defined both in terms of feelings and physiological responses and valence is defined both in
terms of feelings and behaviors. I have tried to show above that the adoption of a
phenomenological notion of valence and arousal are problematic. The core affect category would
be much clearer, more useful and less objectionable if these phenomenological claims were left
behind. At least until there are advances in measuring phenomenological data and the
methodological issues are satisfactorily addressed. I do not mean to revert back to behaviorism
and I acknowledge that an important aspect of the emotions is that they feel a certain way, but
given the issues involved in recording subjective experience this data cannot be included in the
assessment of core affect as a natural kind. Thus, in the subsequent chapters I will focus solely
on the physiological and behavioral notions. For the purposes of my thesis, I will understand
valence and arousal, and consequently, core affect, as essentially behavioral and physiological.
CHAPTER 3: THE CASE FOR CORE AFFECT

Now that we have at least a preliminary understanding of core affect, we are in a position
to asses Barrett’s arguments against discrete emotions and in favor of core affect (2006b). Barrett
18

I am not alone in thinking that this is problematic. See Panksepp (2007) for a further discussion of this problem.
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argues that the empirical evidence does not support the claim that there exist discrete emotion
categories about which scientists could formulate scientifically interesting inductive
generalizations. To put it briefly, she thinks that discrete emotion categories are not natural
kinds. On the other hand, she argues that the empirical evidence suggests that core affect may be
a natural kind. In the first section of this chapter I will explain Richard Boyd’s notion of natural
kinds to ground my discussion of Barrett’s arguments in a philosophically robust notion of
natural kinds. In the second and third sections I will reconstruct Barrett’s arguments in some
detail.

3.1- What is a Natural Kind?
There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about natural kinds (for a sample of recent
discussions on natural kinds, see Hacking 1991; Boyd 1999; Millikan 1999; LaPorte 2003;
Griffiths 2004b). The central idea is that natural kinds “carve nature at its joints” (Plato
Statesman 287c) and thus provide us with fundamental ways to classify objects and study their
properties. The notion of a natural kind is essentially tied up with the problem of induction
because a natural kind singles out a category about which scientific generalizations can be
formed (Machery, 2005; Mill, 1843; Quine, 1969; Boyd, 1991, 1999; Hacking, 1991). Natural
kinds are contrasted with arbitrary groupings of things for which only a few or no generalizations
can be formed. For example, species such as “whales” and chemical elements such as “oxygen”
are natural kinds, but collections of jewels and things that weigh more than 50 pounds are
arbitrary groups. Members of a natural kind must share, non-accidentally, a number of
theoretically and scientifically important properties suitable to produce generalizations about
them. These shared properties mark natural kinds as “the building blocks of scientific
generalizations” (Machery 2005, 446). Since scientific generalizations are a goal of most
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empirical sciences, scientists aim to develop empirical theories that identify natural kinds in their
domain.
Given this general notion of a natural kind, philosophers have proposed many different
ways to characterize them (e.g. Locke, 1690; Venn, 1886; Russell, 1948; Mill, 1843; Kripke,
1980; Boyd, 1991). The most influential recent notion of natural kinds comes from Richard Boyd
(1991; 1999). Boyd advocates a causal notion of natural kinds where a kind is natural insofar as
it constitutes a maximal class whose instances share non-accidentally many, but not all,
scientifically relevant properties.19 He proposes that this notion of natural kinds is captured by
what he terms a “causal homeostatic property cluster.” Boyd writes:
I argue that there are a number of scientifically important kinds (properties,
relations, etc.) whose natural definitions are very much like the property cluster
definitions postulated by ordinary-language philosophers except that the unity of
properties in the defining cluster is mainly causal rather than conceptual. The
natural definition of one of these homeostatic property cluster kinds is determined
by the members of a cluster of often co-occurring properties and by the
(“homeostatic”) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence.20
The members of a homeostatic property cluster kind do not have to share all the same properties.
Instead, Boyd proposes that what matters is that the imperfectly shared properties are shared
non-accidentally due to a common causal mechanism. On the basis of (i) the imperfectly shared
cluster of properties and (ii) a common causal (homeostatic) mechanism that underlies the
properties, we can, respectively, identify instances of a natural kind, and form inductive
generalizations about the kind.

19

Boyd claims that his theory of natural kinds is independent of any general metaphysical realist claims (1991). He
argues that both realists and empiricists should accept his theory. Realists will accept that natural kind terms are
projectable (provide explanations and predictions) because these terms refer to real causal structures in the world.
Boyd also believes that empiricists should accept that natural kind terms are projectable because there are
empirically adequate background theories that allow us to construct projectable terms. It is beyond the scope of the
present paper to analyze this claim, but see Griffiths (1997) for more on this argument.
20
Boyd (1991), 141. Emphasis in original
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According to Boyd, the paradigmatic example of a natural kind is “species” because species
specify “categories apt for induction and explanation in [biological] science” (1991, 142). The
natural kind “species” constitutes a homeostatic property cluster because the fact that species
members (imperfectly) share morphological, physiological, and behavioral properties is caused
by the mechanism of natural selection (the exchange of genetic materials) underlying the
property cluster.21 In other words, members of a species do not have to share necessary and
sufficient properties for being “species” members. In fact, Boyd believes that there will
necessarily be indeterminacy in the extension of species because speciation depends on
populations that are intermediate between the parent species and the emerging new species. Boyd
(1991, 142) writes:
Any ‘refinement’ of classification which artificially eliminated the resulting
indeterminacy in classification would obscure the central fact about heritable
variations in phenotype upon which biological evolution depends and would be
scientifically inappropriate and misleading.
Since “species” is a natural kind, it seems that some natural kinds may be counterexamples to
“essentialist” theories that require necessary and sufficient conditions of membership for natural
kinds (e.g., Kripke 1980). Additionally, the species example demonstrates that the notion of a
homeostatic property cluster captures the way at least some paradigmatic natural kinds are used.
This being said, Ruth Millikan (1999) has offered a different notion of natural kinds.
According to Millikan, at least some “kinds are defined by reference to historical relations
among members, not, in the first instance, by reference to properties” (54). On her view, natural
kinds are best characterized by the historical relations between members of the kind and not the
properties that the members share due to a causal mechanism. Although Millikan’s notion is
different than Boyd’s, it is not clear if Millikan’s view is a critique of Boyd’s theory. She admits
21

Although there are debates, both in philosophy and biology, about how to define a species, most agree that the
exchange of genetic material is essential to speciation.
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this in a footnote: “I am not clear whether the next few paragraphs are best read as exegesis of
Boyd or as criticism” (Ibid., 63). Additionally, Boyd argues that Millikan’s ‘historical kinds’
form a “sub-set of the HPC kinds” (Boyd 1999, 84). In other words, Boyd believes that
Millikan’s notion of natural kinds is reducible to his theory. I will not get into the details of this
debate and assume Boyd’s notion of natural kinds in what follows.
There are four reasons why I will assume Boyd’s notion of natural kinds. First, Boyd’s
notion of natural kinds is widely accepted by many philosophers of emotion (e.g. Griffiths, 1997;
Prinz, 2004a; Charland, 2002) and emotion scientists (e.g. Barrett, 2006b; Ekman, 1999b; Izard,
2007). Second, Griffiths (1997) has argued that defining a natural kind by a homeostatic
property cluster is ideal for the blurry boundaries of the emotions. “Emotion” is a notoriously
difficult term to define in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. On Boyd’s account this
need not preclude research on the emotions- it is even a live possibility that “emotion,” like
“species” must exhibit indeterminacy. Third, most emotion scientists, including Barrett, are
concerned with classifying emotions in terms of homologues (shared ancestry) rather than
analogues (similar function). Since the concern is with finding shared ancestry rather than similar
function, members will not necessarily need to share all the properties.
Fourth, adopting Boyd’s theory of natural kinds allows scientists to form testable
hypotheses and evaluate the evidence for these hypotheses. In other words, scientists can form a
hypothesis that X is a natural kind and test this hypothesis. To test the hypothesis, researchers
look for a cluster of observable properties with a common underlying causal mechanism. If X
meets these requirements, then X is a natural kind about which scientifically interesting inductive
generalizations can be made. The ability to form testable hypotheses, arguably, is what has made
Boyd’s notion of a natural kind so attractive to scientists, like Barrett who explicitly cites Boyd.
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Barrett’s arguments are best understood in light of Boyd’s theory because her arguments involve
a number of scientifically relevant properties and an underlying causal mechanism. These are the
criteria that she presents for natural kindhood.
In the next sections of this chapter, I will reconstruct Barrett’s argument that discrete
emotions are not natural kinds. Then I will lay out her argument that the empirical evidence for
core affect as a natural kind is suggestive. In order to make the arguments as clear as possible I
propose a compact summary of Boyd’s core idea and requirements for natural kindhood:
Core Idea: A kind is natural if and only if its members tend to share a family of co-occurring
properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence nonaccidentally.
In light of this account, there are two requirements a kind K must satisfy in order to qualify as
natural:
Requirement 1: There is a family of often co-occurring properties P1….Pn associated with
instances of K.
Requirement 2: There is a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about the family of
often co-occurring properties seen in instances of K.
Are discrete emotions natural kinds under this view? Is core affect a natural kind? Barrett
provides a negative answer to the first questions and a positive answer to the second question. I
will argue in chapter four that core affect is not a natural kind, but that subsets of core affective
space may be natural kinds Let us consider her arguments in some detail.
3.2- Barrett’s Case Against Discrete Approaches to Emotions
Some discrete emotion theorists, for example Ekman (1999a; 1999b) and Panksepp
(1998; 2000), have argued that discrete emotions are natural kinds sensu Boyd. The idea is that
fear, anger, joy, sadness, and so on are natural kinds. Barrett is convinced that the empirical
evidence does not support the claim that discrete emotions are natural kinds. Barrett concludes
that the discrete emotions approach has failed to find natural kinds and therefore should be
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abandoned. She presents core affect as an alternative paradigm that will be more successful in
finding natural kinds. In what follows I will reconstruct Barrett’s argument that the discrete
emotions do not fulfill requirements 1 and 2. In evaluating Barrett’s arguments, I will focus
solely on the disconfirming evidence that she presents and not on the arguments given by
discrete emotion theorists.
3.2.1- Do the Discrete Emotions Share Properties?
There are four shared properties commonly mentioned by discrete emotion theorists
(especially affect program theorists) as substantiating the view that discrete emotions are natural
kinds. These are (P1) automatic,22 pan-cultural,23 and primitive24 signature facial expressions for
each emotion, (P2) the semantic structure of discrete emotion terms as indicated by self-reports,
(P3) physiological distinctness, and (P4) behavioral distinctiveness. Barrett argues that there is no
compelling evidence that instances of discrete emotion categories share these properties. The
consequence is that Barrett thinks, requirement 1, is not meet: There is no family of often cooccurring properties P1….Pn associated with any discrete emotion. I now turn to a discussion of
each property.

22

In the scientific literature, the term “automatic” is often used to indicate that a given emotion is associated with
distinct autonomic nervous system reactions. In this thesis I am referring to this as “physical distinctiveness.” By
“automatic” I mean that the quick on-set of the production of facial expressions and automatic activations of
attitudes. That is, the accessibility of information in memory that can be called upon immediately in response to an
emotionally salient stimuli. See Fazio (1986) and Bargh (1992) for more on the topic of the automatic activation of
attitudes.
23
In the literature what I am calling pan-cultural is often termed “universal.” If something is universal or pancultural, then it is reliably recognized in all cultures.
24
In the scientific literature if something is primitive, then it appears in infants and is homologous in other
mammals.
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3.2.1.1- Facial Expressions (P1)
One of the most frequently used methods to study the emotions is to correlate empirical
data with emotionally salient facial expressions.25 I will begin this section with a general
discussion of the methodology and goals in the scientific study of facial expressions of emotion,
which will be relevant throughout the thesis. I will then reconstruct Barrett’s argument that there
are no signature facial expressions for discrete emotions.
In general, there are two methodologies in the study of facial expressions of emotions.
The first, and most commonly used, Barrett calls perception-based studies of the face (2006b,
37).26 In these studies subjects are presented with pictures of facial expressions of discrete
emotions and asked to judge which discrete emotion is being portrayed.27 While subjects are
engaged in this task, certain physiological measurements, such as autonomic nervous system
reactions28 as well as neural activations, are recorded. The assumption is that in order for
subjects to exhibit above-chance accuracy at judging the correct discrete emotion portrayed in
the facial expression they must be able to extract or decode information about the specific
discrete emotion based on the facial expression.
25

Historically, the scientific desire to find the facial signals of emotions can be traced back to Darwin’s book The
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1859), but there has recently been an explosion of empirical work
specifically on facial signals. This is due to studies conducted in the 1960’s and 1970’s by Ekman (1971) and,
independently, Izard (1977) where they presented subjects with pictures of emotional facial expressions and asked
them to identify the corresponding emotion. They found that subjects reliably recognized the facial expressions
across cultures and even in preliterate cultures with little contact with Western cultures. These findings lead
scientists, like Ekman and Izard, to claim that these expressions are pancultural, primitive, and automatic. Ekman
(1976) further mapped out the facial muscles involved in these expressions and formed the Facial Action Coding
Scheme (FACS), which allows scientists to describe and recognize any facial movement.
26
This type of study is often termed the “recognition of emotional expressions.”
27
There are databases of pictures that researchers use that have been tested to show that they are reliably judged by
subjects as depicting the given emotion. Ekman’s (1976) Facial Action Coding Scheme (FACS) has produced a set
of pictures of facial expressions of discrete emotions that researchers use. There is also an alternative set of pictures
that researchers use created by Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert (1999) called the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS). These pictures are not of facial expressions per se, but more generally show emotionally evocative events.
The pictures from the IAPS database are used more frequently in studies that assume a dimensional approach to
emotions.
28
See footnote 16 for an explanation of the autonomic nervous system. The central point to keep in mind is that the
autonomic nervous system is generally not under conscious control and so is thought to provide good evidence for
an underlying causal mechanism.
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The second methodology used in studies of facial expressions Barrett calls productionbased studies of the face (2006b, 37). In these sorts of studies, researchers measure the facial
expressions of the subjects and other physiological responses (such as heart rate) during an
emotionally evocative event. In order to evoke the emotion, researchers ask subjects to
remember an emotionally salient event in their lives (for example, the death of a loved one) or
present subjects with pictures that are emotionally evocative, such as pictures of dead children.
Throughout the paper I will distinguish between perception-based studies and production-based
studies to clarify an understanding of the scientific research I am about to present.
In production-based studies the goal is to map out the specific set of facial muscle
movements for each discrete emotion and find bodily signatures for them. In perception-based
studies the goal is to distinguish which discrete emotions are recognized universally across
cultures (what I will call panculturality) and the physiological responses associated with the
discrete emotion.29 The general goal of both methodologies is to find facial expressions of
emotion that are automatic (what I will call automaticity)30 and primitive (what I will call
primitivity).31 Fulfilling these three criteria -automaticity, panculturality, and primitivity- ensures
that one’s theory of the emotions meets the rough requirements for a good theory of the emotions
as introduced at the beginning of chapter two. Panculturality is assumed to demonstrate that the
emotion is not culturally relative or individualistic. An ideal theory of the emotions would not
just tell us about an individual’s emotion, but about any individual in any culture. Automaticity
and primitivity are thought to provide explanations of the emotions wherever they appear, in
29

In other words, in perception-based studies subjects from a wide variety of cultures must be able to accurately
judge the emotion in the picture and this is assumed to demonstrate that the emotion has an underlying causal
mechanism.
30
The extraction or decoding and production of the discrete emotion portrayed in the pictures of facial expressions
by the subject is thought to take place compulsively and quickly.
31
The ability to decode or extract this information is thought to be primitive or innate because children and other
mammals may be able to recognize and/or perform facial expressions of discrete emotions. For example, a primate
may display a facial expression that is equivalent to a human smile and thus an expression of happiness.
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humans or non-humans, and may indicate that there are homologous structures. Meeting all three
criteria provide reasons for hypothesizing that there is an underlying causal mechanism for the
emotion and ensures that the theory meets the criteria for a good theory of the emotions.
Comparative studies are invaluable to ensure that the theory applies to all individuals that
experience emotions, especially non-humans. I now turn to Barrett’s argument that discrete
emotions do not fulfill these criteria.
3.2.1.1.1- Automaticity
Production of a facial expression is automatic when it is not under rational control and
has a quick on-set. For example, a facial expression of fear is automatic if it is produced by the
subject within a short amount of time absent rational control. Discrete emotion theorists have
argued that the production of facial expressions corresponding to the discrete emotions takes
place within around 25 ms (Ekman 1999b). According to Barrett, evidence from animal
communication research has failed to support this hypothesis. Seyfarth and Cheney (2003)
showed clearly that nonhuman animals rarely produce involuntary, reflexive displays (Barrett
2006b, 39). It is not clear if this is really an objection to the claim that the facial expressions of
discrete emotions have a quick on-set, but given this “evidence” Barrett concludes that
production of discrete emotion facial expressions are not automatic. Thus, automaticity is not a
property that can be attributed to discrete emotions as part of the property cluster.
3.2.1.1.2- Panculturality
In addition to the automaticity of facial expressions, discrete emotion theorists claim that
facial expressions of discrete emotions are pan-culturally recognized (e.g. Izard 1977). Barrett
rejects this claim. She argues that in perception-based studies of the face there are several factors
that bias the results- i.e. factors that inflate subjects’ accuracy in ratings of discrete emotion
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faces. In a meta-review of the empirical literature Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) found that
accuracy rates reported for each discrete emotion portrayed in the facial expression vary with the
research team that conducted the study. Barrett attributes this variation to the employment of
“methods that were more likely to produce large cross-cultural accuracy rates” (Barrett 2006b,
38). In other words, the results can be attributed to the methodology employed by the
researchers, not the recognitional abilities of subjects. Three classes of biases artificially raise
accuracy rates.
First, there are social biases. Take for example the phenomena known as “in-group
advantage.” The argument is that “people are generally more accurate at judging emotional
behaviors depicted by members of their own cultural group than at judging those depicted by
members of a different cultural group” (2006b, 38). A study by Elfenbein and Ambady (2003),
found that in-group advantage has significant impact on the accuracy of subjects’ judgments. The
subjects in Elfenbein’s and Ambady’s study were more accurate at picking out the correct facial
expression on average by 9.3% if the facial expression was portrayed by a member of their own
culture. As another example of a social bias, Mesquita (2003) has argued that the task itself is
highly Westernized task and may not be a valid task for members of non-Western cultures.
Second, there are technique biases. Discrete emotion theorists often use short lists of
terms, creating what Russell calls a “forced-choice method” (1991). The method is “forced”
because the subjects are not allowed to assign their own terms to the facial expressions, but are
provided with terms to label the expressions. The method is further “forced” because the terms
that subjects are given are discrete emotion terms that are already suspected to be pan-cultural.
Another technique bias is using static, poised expressions that Barrett says “depict caricatures of
emotion” rather than having subjects judge spontaneous facial movements (2006b, 38). She
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believes that these caricatures do not reflect the prototypical expression (emoters’ actual
production of the expression in everyday interactions) and that it “departs from the central
tendency of its category in a way that will make it maximally distinctive from other categories”
(Barrett 2006b, 38). In other words, the pictures show exaggerated facial expressions and these
are different from the expressions seen in everyday life. Thus, subjects’ responses are not
indicative of the discriminating abilities that we employ in everyday life.
For example, a prototypical facial expression of anger would depict the expression that is
seen when an individual is experiencing anger, whereas a caricature facial expression of anger
would exaggerate the prototypical expression so that it is easier to distinguish and classify from
other emotions like sadness. “Caricatured stimuli are easier to categorize than prototypic stimuli
when the categories in question are highly interrelated” (Barrett 2006b, 38). Barrett concludes
that “the fact that caricatures give the clearest results in emotion-perception studies may be
indirect evidence that the categories of anger, sadness, fear, and so on are themselves highly
interrelated without firm boundaries” (Barrett 2006b, 38). In sum, given these issues the claim by
discrete emotion theorists that the ability to distinguish between these expressions is pan-cultural
is on poor empirical footing. Therefore, panculturality is not a property that can be attributed to
discrete emotions as part of the property cluster.
3.2.1.1.3- Primitivity
Discrete emotion theorists have also claimed that facial expressions of discrete emotions
are primitive (e.g. Ekman 1999b). The ability to discriminate facial expressions is said to be
primitive if it is exhibited early in development (e.g. by infants) and in non-humans. Barrett
believes that evidence from developmental psychology calls into question this claim. First, she
argues that the ability to recognize facial expressions itself (whether they are emotional or not) is
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not primitive. Infants do not seem to recognize faces as faces. Although infants show a general
preference for faces, this is arguably due to general perceptual preferences and not due to the
meaning of the facial expression (for a review see Turati 2004). Second, children categorize
faces on the basis of simple features of the face like open mouths, or the showing of teeth. In
several studies, researchers have found that infants cannot distinguish between a smile,
associated with happiness, that involves the showing of teeth and angry faces that also involve
the showing of teeth (Caron et al., 1985). According to Barrett, this shows that infants use
criteria such as teeth to categorize facial expressions rather than by using the emotional meaning
associated with the face, such as happiness or anger.
Barrett acknowledges that this objection may be dismissed. It could be the case that the
recognition of facial expressions of discrete emotions is primitive, but that this ability does not
materialize at birth. Instead the ability may develop as certain neural systems develop. Even
though this may be the case, Barrett believes we can at least conclude that infants and children
do not have the conceptual knowledge needed to recognize facial expressions of discrete
emotions. In fact, according to a study by Widen and Russell (2003) children do not posses the
knowledge of emotion concepts until the age of five. Before the age of five children use a few
emotional terms, like “happy” and “sad,” to describe all emotions and use larger categories like
“positive” and “negative” to describe emotions in general (Ibid.). Barrett concludes that
perception based studies of discrete emotion faces demonstrate that the ability to discriminate
facial expressions of discrete emotions is not primitive. Thus, primitivity is not a property that
can be attributed to discrete emotions as part of the property cluster. The next property that is
claimed to be part of the natural property cluster kind of discrete emotions is the semantic
structure of discrete emotion terms.
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3.2.1.2- Semantic Structure (P2)
Barrett argues that if emotions are best studied as discrete categories, then self-reports of
emotional experience should exhibit a simple structure (2006b). That is, when subjects are asked
about their emotional experiences in self-reports, the terms they use to describe these experiences
should be grouped around discrete categories (fear, anger, happiness, and so on). In other words,
“measures of emotion experience should produce evidence of discrete, discriminable categories”
(Barrett 2006b, 35). According to Barrett, evidence of this sort would indicate that reports of any
given emotion (e.g. sadness) constitute a unified content area (e.g. feelings of sadness) and not
another content area (e.g. feelings of anger). In addition, if semantic studies showed a consistent
grouping of discrete categories, this would indicate that the given emotion could not be broken
down into more basic parts, like valence and arousal.
Barrett argues that there is little evidence in self-reports that people classify their
emotional experience in terms of discrete categories. That is, subjects do not consistently group
their experience of emotions into discrete units. For example, a number of studies have reported
that subjects do not consistently group pictures of negative facial expressions, such as disgust,
fear, and sadness (e.g. Ekman 1971). Reports of negative emotions like fear and sadness are so
highly correlated that there is often no unique variance to distinguish these discrete emotions.
Barrett claims that “scales that are explicitly built to measure discrete emotions tend to show
high correlations between like-valenced states” (2006b, 35). For example, the fact that facial
expressions of discrete emotions like fear and sadness are not distinguished consistently from
one another may be explained by the fact that they are both negatively valenced. Barrett
concludes that there is not a unified, simple semantic structure to discrete emotions terms and
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therefore semantic structure is not a property that can be part of the natural property cluster of
discrete emotions.
3.2.1.3- Physiological Distinctness (P3)
Since James (1884) proposed that each discrete emotion has a unique bodily pattern,
researchers have been attempting to identify these signature bodily responses. Researchers are
primarily concerned with the autonomic nervous system responses because these are generally
not under conscious control. The assumption is that responses not under conscious control
demonstrate patterns that have been adaptive and indicate an underlying causal mechanism.
Several researchers argue that there are distinct bodily responses associated with discrete
emotions (e.g. Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen, 1983). Barrett believes that studies supporting this
claim are misleading. She says that “meta-analytic reviews of this literature generally find that
categories like anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and happiness cannot be fully differentiated by
autonomic activity alone (Cacioppo et al., 1997; 2000)” (2006b, 41). Discrete emotion theorists
have similarly reported that subjects have trouble distinguishing between negative emotions, like
disgust, anger, and fear (e.g. Ekman 1971; Izard 1977).
At the same time, Barrett acknowledges that some distinctive differences have been
found for discrete emotions, but not for most of the discrete emotions. Meta-studies have shown
that there is a high amount of heterogeneity between the bodily responses recorded for given
discrete emotions. For example, anger has been found to increase the heart rate in comparison
with happiness and decrease heart rate in comparison to fear (for a review see Cacioppo et al.
2000). Thus, there is no characteristic level of heart rate or change in heart rate associated with
anger. From this and other empirical evidence, Barrett concludes that “such heterogeneity likely
indicates that unspecified variables are moderating the relations between emotion categories and
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these peripheral nervous system responses32” (2006b, 41). Barrett believes that these unspecified
variables are most likely valence and arousal.
Barrett also offers alternative explanations for the data supporting distinct physical
responses associated with discrete emotions. First, vascular patterns that appear to distinguish
between fear and anger also distinguish between threat and challenge appraisals according to
several studies (e.g. Blascovich and Mendes 2000). Barrett argues that researchers may
inadvertently manipulate appraisals of challenge and threat while trying to generate expressions
of anger and fear. Second, skin conductance responses that appear to configure around discrete
emotions may be explained by attention allocation, which some studies have shown (e.g. Frith
and Allen, 1983).
A third alternative explanation Barrett provides is that autonomic nervous system
responses may be in the service of behavior or expected behavior. The appearance of distinct
physiological response for the discrete emotions may be explained by metabolic demands
associated with the actual or expected behavior of the given discrete emotion. For example, the
increased heart rate associated with fear may be due to the expected or actual metabolic demands
associated with a fight or flight response. Additionally, Barrett claims that a diverse set of
behaviors are evident for discrete emotions so that there are not behaviors unique to discrete
emotions like fear. She concludes that “if autonomic activity is in the service of behavior (or
expected behavior), and if a heterogeneous range of behaviors is associated with a given emotion
category, then emotion-specific autonomic patterns are unlikely on a priori grounds” (2006b, 4142). Instead, the apparent configuration of autonomic nervous system reactions may be due to the
subjects’ preparation for specific behaviors, rather than the discrete emotion.

32

The peripheral nervous system is the system in which sensory, motor, and autonomic nerves are linked to the
central nervous system.
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Barrett concludes that the evidence for distinct autonomic nervous system responses for
the discrete emotions is problematic, since there are inconsistent findings across studies and
alternative explanations have not been ruled out. There does not appear to be a property of
unique bodily responses associated with each discrete emotion. Therefore, physiological
distinctiveness is not a property that can be attributed to the discrete emotions as part of the
property cluster.
3.2.1.4- Behaviors (P4)
The next property that is signature behaviors for each discrete emotion. For example, it
has been claimed that the behavior associated with anger is attacking or the urge to attack and
fear is associated with freezing or fleeing or the urge to freeze or flee (Frijda, 1986). Barrett
claims that signature behaviors are not and cannot be associated with specific discrete emotions.
Emotions are “specific, context-bound attempts to deal with a situation” and “functional
demands vary with situations, making it likely that instances of the same emotion can be
associated with a range of behaviors [instead of a distinct behavior]” (Barrett 2006b, 41).
As evidence for the claim that signature behaviors are not observed for each discrete
emotion, Barrett cites the animal learning literature. Several studies have shown that animal
behavioral responses correspond to situational demands (e.g. Bouton, 2005). For example, rats
that are put into a fear situation (that is defined by the presence of a predator) show a range of
behaviors from orientating their attention to the predator, freezing, jumping, or attacking
depending on the proximity of the predator (for a review see Bouton, 2005). Barrett concludes
that behaviors do not group consistently around specific discrete emotions and that many
different behaviors are associated with many different discrete emotions. Therefore, behavior
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does not constitute a property that is indicative of each discrete emotion and that can be claimed
to be part of the natural property cluster kind.
In sum, Barrett has argued that the discrete emotions do not fulfill requirement 1 for
natural kind status. There is no distinct facial expression that is automatic, pan-cultural, and
primitive for the discrete emotions. Additionally, she argues that there is little evidence for the
discrete emotions in semantic structure, no distinct physical response for them, and no signature
behaviors associated with the discrete emotions. Therefore, there is not a cluster of often cooccurring properties.
3.2.2- Do the Discrete Emotions Share Causal Mechanisms?
The causal mechanism that underlies the homeostatic property cluster (requirement 2) of
each discrete emotion is assumed to be a distinct neural mechanism in the brain.33 Many discrete
emotion theorists have claimed that discrete emotions have specific neural causes (e.g. Damasio,
1999; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1993; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998). For example, it has been
claimed that the basal ganglia is the causal mechanism for disgust. Barrett cites two metaanalyses of neuroimaging studies of discrete emotions over the past 10 years that do not show
distinct neural activations corresponding to the discrete emotions (Murphy et al., 2003; Phan et
al., 2002).34 According to Barrett, these studies found that “unique activation patterns for each
category of emotion were difficult to discern, and those that materialized were less consistent
than expected” (2006b, 43). In particular, the meta-reviews showed that there was a wide
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A causal mechanism can be cashed out in several different ways: as distinct neural circuits, psychological
mechanisms (e.g. affect programs- Ekman, Izard, Tomkins), cognitive modules (Cosmides and Tooby 2000),
neurotransmitters, or motivations and it is assumed that all of these options will have some sort of correspondence
with the brain. A term that is often used when discussing causal mechanisms is “brain markers.” One way of finding
such a “brain marker,” popular in the literature is to apply neuroimaging techniques (MRI, fMRI, PET) to find
increased activation.
34
These meta-reviews included a variety of experimental paradigms, including emotion perception (showing
subjects pictures of facial expressions of emotions) and emotion induction (where subjects are presented a stimulus
to induce an emotional state). See Barrett 2006b, 43-45 for a detailed explanation of the meta-reviews.
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divergence between reported neural localizations for anger, happiness, and sadness. I proceed to
give a particular example that Barrett emphasizes.
The meta-reviews reported the most agreement between studies regarding the association
of fear and the amygdala, but according to Barrett the “correspondences were lower than what
might be expected if the amygdala represented a core fear system in the brain” (2006b, 43). For
example, Phan et al. (2002) reported that only 60% of the studies reviewed found increased
activation in the amygdala in studies involving fear and Murphy et al. (2003) reported that less
than 40% of the studies reviewed found increased activation in the amygdala in studies involving
fear. In addition, subjects with amygdala damage can correctly classify facial expressions of fear
when their attention is directed towards the stimuli (Adolphs et al., 2005) and the amygdala has
been found to be active in situations that do not involve fear, such as eye gaze (Adams et al.,
2003). It seems there is not a strong association between fear and the amygdala. Thus, Barrett
claims that the amygdala is likely not the causal mechanism associated with fear.
Barrett also argues that there are alternative explanations for the apparent association
between the amygdala and fear. For example, stimulus features such as uncertainty or novelty
may have produced this correspondence. Similar problems have been observed for other discrete
emotions and proposed causal mechanisms. Given the empirical evidence and the possibility of
alternative explanations, Barrett concludes that there is little support for the claim that discrete
emotions have distinct neural causes and therefore the discrete emotions fail to fulfill
requirement 2 for natural kind status.
Let us take stock of the argument so far. Barrett has argued that there is neither a cluster
of properties associated with discrete emotions, thus failing to fulfill requirement 1, nor a causal
mechanism associated with them, thus failing to fulfill requirement 2. In particular, there are no
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facial expressions that are automatic, pan-cultural, and primitive for each discrete emotion, there
is no evidence of distinct groupings of the semantic terms for discrete emotions, there are not
unique physical reactions associated with the discrete emotions, and a diverse set of behaviors
are associated with the discrete emotions. Additionally, there is little to no evidence of a causal
mechanism for each of the discrete emotions.
According to core affect theorists, such as Barrett and Russell, one of the main reasons
that the discrete emotion approach has not established natural kinds is because it uses a folk
category rather than a scientific one. Now that we have seen Barrett’s argument against the
natural kind status of discrete emotions, I will turn to the alleged theoretical advantages of core
affect.
3.3- Alleged Theoretical Advantages of Core Affect
The goal of the scientific study of emotion is to find natural kinds about which inductive
generalizations can be formed. As we just saw, Barrett argues that the empirical evidence does
not support the thesis that discrete emotions are natural kinds. Core affect theorists believe that
their theory avoids the problems associated with the discrete emotion approach by proposing a
more elegant scientific theory. Further, they suggest that the case for core affect as a natural kind
is more promising than the case for discrete emotions as natural kinds. I will consider these
alleged theoretical advantages in turn.
Core affect theorists insist that their theory is more elegant than discrete emotion theories
for two reasons: it deals with a more basic scientific concept and it is ontologically more
parsimonious. The basicness of core affect is related to the fact that its components - valence and
arousal - are simple and fundamental. Core affect theorists claim that valence and arousal cannot
be captured by a “lower” concept and that they are more fundamental constituents of affective
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phenomena than discrete emotion categories (Russell 2003). Additionally, many theorists have
described something along the lines of core affect as a basic psychological process across species
(for example, Wundt, 1897; Cannon, 1927; Davidson, 2000; Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson
1999).
Second, core affect is thought to be more ontologically parsimonious because it posits
fewer theoretical entities than the discrete emotion approach. The discrete emotion approach
would have us believe that there is a natural kind for each of the discrete emotions. Core affect
theorists are convinced instead that the affective realm can be further simplified:
A frugal ontology may be all that is needed: Emotional life consists of the continuous
fluctuations in core affect, in pervasive perception of affective qualities, and in the
frequent attribution of core affect to a single Object, all interacting with perceptual,
cognitive, and behavior processes. Occasionally, these components form one of the
prototypical patterns [i.e. a prototypical or discrete emotion].35
Simplicity and ontological parsimony are epistemic virtues that any scientific theory tries to
fulfill. All things being equal, the simpler and more parsimonious theory should be preferred.
This being said, general epistemic virtues are not what is most important to assess the quality of
a scientific theory. What matters most is that the theory matches the causal structure of the
world. Boyd’s account of natural kinds is formulated so that natural kinds are defined as the
kinds which best conform to the causal structure of the world. If core affect theory were simpler
and invoked fewer theoretical entities, but performed poorly in its search for natural kinds, it
would not be preferable. So what is really at issue is the evidence core affect theorists provide in
support of the thesis that core affect is a natural kind. I will accept for the sake of argument that
core affect theory is simpler and ontologically more frugal than the discrete emotions, but leave
this advantage in the background in what follows.
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Russell 2003, 152.
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In support of the claim that core affect may be a natural kind, Barrett provides empirical
evidence that members of the core affective category share a cluster of properties nonaccidentally (thus fulfilling requirement 1) in virtue of a common causal (homeostatic)
mechanism (thus fulfilling requirement 2). As a result, scientifically interesting generalizations
can be formed about all instances of core affect. I will now reconstruct Barrett’s argument that
core affect fulfills each of these requirements. In chapter four I will argue that core affect is not a
natural kind. I will present some disconfirming data or objections to her arguments here, but my
argument will be further explained in the subsequent chapter
3.3.1- Do Instances of Core Affect Share Properties?
Barrett alleges that the four properties commonly mentioned by discrete emotion theorists
(those discussed above in chapter 3.2) better-support core affect as a natural kind. These
properties shared by core affect are: (P1) automatic, pan-cultural, and primitive signature facial
expressions, (P2) the semantic structure of affective terms, (P3) physiological distinctness, and
(P4) behavioral distinctiveness. I will now consider the evidence for each and then assess
whether it supports the case for the natural kind status of core affect.
3.3.1.1- Facial Expressions (P1)
As I pointed out in chapter 3.2, there are two general methodologies employed in the
scientific study of facial expressions of emotion: perception-based studies (examining whether
subjects can accurately identify emotions in pictures) and production-based studies (examining
whether subjects produce facial expressions that are signatures of different emotional states). The
goals of these studies are to find facial expressions of emotions that are automatic, pan-cultural,
and primitive. Now, do the facial expressions associated with core affect have these
characteristics?
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3.3.1.1.1- Automaticity
Barrett argues that there is evidence for the automaticity of the perception of facial
expressions associated with core affect. The perception is said to be automatic if it is fast and
occurs without rational deliberation. Several studies have found that the initial perception of
valence and arousal in facial expressions takes places within 25 ms of encountering the stimulus
(Bargh 1997; Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, and
Hymes 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes 1986). Studies are conducted by
presenting subjects with one stimulus (the primer) and a second stimulus (the target) in short
time intervals. It is assumed that the recognition of the target as having a certain property, such
as valence, in short time intervals indicates that a minimal amount of rational deliberation is
involved, thus, providing evidence for automaticity. Other studies have shown that faces of
positive versus negative emotional states that are presented subliminally influence subsequent
judgments of the valenced value of ambiguous stimuli, whereas supralimnal presentations did
not (Murphy and Zajonc 1993). In other words, the subjects’ perception of the target is
influenced by the primer only when the target and primer are presented in short time periods and
not in longer time periods. This seems to indicate that the perception of facial expressions of core
affect are automatic.
However, such findings depend on specific primers and on the strength of the association
of the primer with the target. As Fazio et al. note “the present findings regarding attitude
activation following repeated expression can be attributed to the resulting strength of the objectevaluation association and not to the extremity of the associated stimuli” (1986, 235). In fact,
there was only an automatic association when primers were followed by the same type of target,
so that the automatic association only appeared when, for example a positively valenced primer
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was followed by a positively valenced target. In trials where they presented subjects with, for
example a negative primer followed by a positive primer, the subjects did not automatically
choose the correct valenced dimension. Additionally, these studies have been critiqued because
the subjects were asked to memorize the primer and therefore may have been consciously
assessing the target, rather than automatically associating the primer and the target. However, in
later studies (such as Bargh et al. 1996) subjects did not memorize the primer, and there
remained a high correspondence between presentation of the valenced primer and subjects’
ability to categorize the valenced target,36 but only when the valence was the same. Therefore,
facial expressions of core affect appear to be automatic.
3.3.1.1.2- Panculturality
Second, there have been studies that Barrett claims show that facial expressions of core affect
are pancultural. Some studies on facial expressions of core affect have asked people to choose
dimensions rather than discrete emotions that correspond to the expression; “two
multidimensional-scaling studies of the feelings conveyed by facial expressions both yielded the
same pleasure and arousal dimension in different languages” (Russell 1991., 439). For example,
studies in Japanese and English (Osaka, 1986), in Greek, Chinese and English (Russell et al.,
1989), in Greek (Triandis and Lambert, 1958.), and in Dutch (Frijda, 1953) all show that subjects
group the expressions consistently around the same level of pleasure and arousal. In other words,
subjects reliably discern the location of the facial expressions of core affect on the circumplex.
As an example, subjects rate facial expressions corresponding to “lethargic” and “depressed” as
negatively valenced and not highly arousing. Further, “no one has yet shown any influence of
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The consistency was statistically more significant (ranging from 100% to 97%) when there was a strong
association between the primer and the target. When there was a weak correspondence the consistency was still
statistically significant, but was much lower (ranging from 87% to 73%) (Bargh et al. 1996, 115).
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language or culture on the nature of the dimensions found in these studies” (Russell 1991, 440).
This seems to indicate that perception of facial expressions of core affect is pan-cultural.
These studies are compelling, but there are fewer studies that focus on dimensions rather than
discrete emotions and in addition it seems that no one has done a study on a preliterate, isolated
culture. The lack of data from a preliterate, isolated culture is necessary because it could be
objected that the consistency in ratings of facial expressions and core affective levels is due to
cultural influence and not due to some innate mechanism. This was an important critique of the
basic emotions theory and a study conducted by Ekman (1971) showed that even people in
isolated, preliterate societies could correctly identify the facial expressions with the
corresponding emotion. Thus this is an objection that core affect theorists will need to address.
3.3.1.1.3- Primitivity
Third, there is evidence that facial expressions of core affect are primitive. Core affect
theorists claim that we are born with the ability to feel pleasure and displeasure. There is much
evidence that babies can feel pleasure and displeasure in the psychological literature (e.g., Emde,
1976, Osgood, 1975; Spitz, 1965, Sroufe, 1979) and that they communicate these feelings
through facial expressions. Infants express negative affect through distinct facial expressions
(Camras, 1992; Camras, Oster, Campos, & Bakemand, 2003) or in terms of arousal (Messenger,
2002).
In addition to the production-based studies on infants, there is also evidence from studies
on children. Children discriminate and label faces largely on the basis of valence and arousal
(Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1985, 1986; Hosie, Gray, Russell, Scott, & Hunter, 1998; Russell &
Bullock, 1986). So, there appears to be evidence from both production and perception-based
studies of facial expressions that children produce and recognize facial expressions of core
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affect. Therefore, facial expressions of core affect appear to be primitive because there is
evidence that infants and children produce and perceive facial expressions of emotions in terms
valence and arousal.
What is missing from this story is a connection with animal studies, as Panksepp (2007)
rightly points out. If emotions emerge from valence and arousal, then there should be evidence in
studies conducted on animals. Panksepp states that it is not clear if core affect is only supposed
to underwrite emotional expression found in humans and not in non-humans.37 If facial
expressions of core affect are only applicable to humans, then I think the evidence given does
support the claim that facial expressions of core affect are primitive. But Russell claims that core
affect is a biological product of evolution, in part to prepare for action and influence behavioral
choices, suggesting that there may be homologues in non-humans (2003, 156). If facial
expressions of core affect do have homologues, then the claim that core affect is a natural kind
may be difficult to prove because it is not clear how scientists would go about studying the facial
expressions of core affect in non-human animals. Core affect theorists recognize the need for
evidence of this sort (Barrett 2007c).
3.3.1.2- Semantic Structure
According to Russell and Barrett, the semantic structure of core affective terms, as judged by
subjects in self-reports, group consistently around levels of valence and arousal. Russell says
“part of the meaning of all mood and emotion-related words in any language can be summarized
by these two underlying dimensions [valence and arousal]” (2003, 153). Anna Wierzbicka
(1999) has found that all human languages have phrases that roughly translate as “I feel good”
and “I feel bad.” This suggests that the concepts of feel, good, and bad are recognized cross37

This is a problem for core affect theorists because as I argued in chapter 2.3 valence and arousal have not been
clearly defined. The phenomenological notion of valence and arousal seem to exclude non-humans or at least it is
not clear how researchers would go about studying valence and arousal in this sense in non-humans.
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culturally, which supports the claim that valence, at least, may have such a semantic role.
Additionally, Russell argues that arousal is also “likely [a] universal semantic dimension of
emotion” (2003, 153). In support of the claim that valence and arousal are pancultural, Barrett
(1995, 53) states:
The two dimensions have been identified in the semantic structure of affective terms and
together typically account for a substantial amount of variance in self-reports of affective
experience. Previous research has suggested that the dimensions represent the semantic
components that individuals use to interpret and communicate their conscious, affective
experience.
Below is a semantic based circumplex from studies that asked subjects to judge the levels of
arousal and valence for affective terms like “nervous” and “happy.” Subjects were asked
questions like whether “nervous” and “afraid” were similarly valenced and arousing, and
subjects responded that they were. Subjects were also asked if “disappointed” and “satisfied”
were similarly valenced and arousing, and subjects responded that they were not. This semantic
based circumplex supports the core affect circumplex as a reliable projection of the affective
space.
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The circumplex above provides good reasons for thinking that subjects categorize
emotions in terms of core affect, but the subjects in these studies were all from Western cultures.
A good theory of the emotions must be able to account for emotions across cultures and people.
Barrett does cite one scientific study that she claims supports the cross-cultural grouping of core
affect (Mesquita, 2003). Upon further inspection, though, Mesquita is concerned with providing
a cultural model for the emotions that is consistent with the basic emotions theory.38 She says
that “some of these responses [facial expressions, peripheral nervous system responses, etc.] are
demonstrably hardwired, but others may be socially learned” (2003, 887). If core affect is
socially learned, then the theory will not apply to all cultures and humans. Therefore, reliable
generalizations regarding the core affective category will not be forthcoming.
3.3.1.3- Physiological Distinctness
In addition to evidence from facial expressions and the semantic structure of affective
terms, Barrett claims that there are distinct autonomic nervous system responses for core
affective states (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Lang et al., 1993). For example, negative affect is
associated with higher diastolic blood pressure, increased heart rate, and decreases in
electrodermal response duration. These measures are relative to positive affect and contrastive
properties are seen for negative affect. So, whereas negative affect is associated with higher
blood pressure and decreased electrodermal responses, positive affect is associated with
decreases in blood pressure and heart rate and increases in electrodermal response duration.
There are additional studies that she claims show that core affect involves distinct peripheral
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“The very course of emotions- the ways in which the potential of emotions is realized- appears to differ as a
function of cultural models. Culture is, therefore, not spoiling or distracting from the basic theory of emotions, as
has long been assumed. Rather, it should be considered a necessary aspect of emotion theory. Basically, emotions
are cultural, even though that is not the only thing they are” (Mesquita 2003, 887).
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nervous system responses (Cacioppo et al., 1997, 2000; Bradley & Lang, 2000). Therefore,
Barrett argues that there are distinct physical reactions associated with core affect.
One objection to the claim that core affective states have distinctive physiological signatures
is that all of these studies were done on humans. Again, a good theory of the emotions should be
able to explain emotional phenomena wherever it is present and many people would argue that
animals experience emotions. Thus, the distinctive physiological signatures found in humans,
must also be found in animals, or an argument must be provided for why the physiological
measurements of animals do not matter. Additionally, Panksepp (2007) notes that if core affect
better explains affective states than discrete emotion approaches, then core affective theorists
need evidence to explain away the evidence from animals given by the discrete emotion theorists
3.3.1.4- Behaviors
According to Barrett, voluntary actions, behaviors, or action tendencies (readiness to
achieve or maintain a particular sort of relationship with the environment) are distinct for core
affect. There is evidence from scientific studies that some behaviors can be considered
expressive, in the sense that organisms’ behaviors are indicative of its core affective states. For
example, Cacioppo and Gardner (1999) argue that approach behavior indicates positive valence
and withdrawal behavior indicate negative valence. Additionally, valence and arousal have been
used to explain diverse sets of behaviors (see Russell 2003 for a review). The experience of
negatively valenced states over prolonged periods of times has been used to explain
psychological problems involving sex (Abramson & Ponkerton 1995), drug abuse (R.L. Solomon
1977), aggression (Berkowitz 1993), and eating (Pinel, Assanand & Lehman 2000). While an
understanding of core affect may contribute to explanations for behaviors and help an individual

44
to identify the emotional state of another, there is no evidence that there are unique behaviors
that correspond to core affective states.
3.3.2- Do Instances of Core Affect Share a Causal Mechanism?
Lastly, Barrett provides some reason to think that there is an underlying causal
mechanism to core affective states and believes that this is the strongest evidence for core affect
as a natural kind. There may also be a neurotransmitter associated with core affect. Barrett says
that “the dopamine system in the nucleus accumbens is associated with negative affective
motivational states more broadly (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Reynolds & Berridge, 2002,
2003)” (Barrett 2006b, 45). Core affect theorists claim that areas of activation in the brain during
emotional episodes coincide with areas of activation for valence and arousal, which would
indicate a neurobiological substrate or brain marker for core affect (Panksepp 2000; Bradley &
Lang 2000; Cacioppo et al. 1997, 2000; Wagner et al. 2003). Barrett states that “neural
activations provide a strong empirical basis for hypothesizing that a general affect system
constitutes the most basic building block of emotional life” (2006b, 49). Finding such a brain
marker for core affect would explain the causal mechanism that underlies the category and
provide evidence for the claim that core affect constitutes a natural kind.39
Barrett relies heavily on two meta-analyses of emotion research (Phan, et al 2001 &
Wager, et al 2003). The meta-analysis by Wager reviewed 65 PET and fMRI studies of
emotional tasks. The meta-analysis by Phan reviewed 55 PET and fMRI studies of emotional
tasks. Barrett claims that these studies give us a starting point in analyzing the data collected to
see if core affect does constitute a natural kind and that their findings support the claim that there
may be a brain marker for core affect. She claims that “both analyses observed greater left-sided
39

I should emphasize that the neurobiological information for this only provides a preliminary sketch of very broad
brain areas. No one has yet been able to causally reduce any emotional experiences to neurobiological processes.
(Barrett 2006b)
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activations (left-lateralization) for approach- (vs. withdrawal) related affect” (2006c, 81). This
would indicate that there may be a brain marker for at least the valence dimension.40 When
examining the empirical evidence for the arousal dimension, she admits that the evidence is less
clear. In fact she believes that the causal mechanism underlying core affect has yet to be fully
analyzed, but that from these meta-analyses we can at least draw a tentative conclusion that core
affect activates particular areas of the brain, indicating that there is an underlying causal
mechanism. In addition, the core affect theorists claim that there is evidence that psychological
disorders arise from or are associated with brain areas relevant to core affect (Barlow 2002;
Hariri & Holmes 2006; Hariri et al. 2005). I will now assess the evidence in more detail.
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING CORE AFFECT
Now that we have considered Barrett’s arguments against the natural kind status of
discrete emotions and for the natural kind status of core affect we are finally in a position to
address the central question of this thesis: Is core affect a natural kind? In this chapter I will
argue that, contra Barrett (2006), the evidence does not suggest that core affect is a natural kind.
Before doing so, I want to remind the reader of what it takes to be a natural kind sensu Boyd (see
section 3.1 for a more detailed analysis). Here is a compact summary of Boyd’s core idea:
A kind is natural if and only if its members tend to share a family of co-occurring properties
and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence nonaccidentally.
In light of this account, there are two requirements a kind K must satisfy in order to qualify
as natural:
Requirement 1: There is a family of often co-occurring properties P1….Pn associated with
instances of K.
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I am glossing over some issues regarding the different dimensional approaches. I am here assuming that the
approach dimension is related to the valence dimension (see Ch. 2), but only because Wager states that the “valence
results were very similar to those for approach/withdraw.” (520) I assume this is also why Barrett includes it in her
work. (2007b)
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Requirement 2: There is a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about the family of
often co-occurring properties seen in instances of K.
In section 3.2 I considered Barrett’s argument that the discrete emotions do not satisfy
requirements 1 and 2. In section 3.3 I introduced her reasons to think that core affect does fulfill
requirements 1 and 2. In the next section I will argue that despite Barrett’s arguments to the
contrary, core affect does not appear to fulfill requirements 1 and 2.
4.1- The Status of Core Affect as a Natural Kind
Barrett’s key hypothesis on core affect is the following:
The empirical case supporting the hypothesis that core affect is a natural kind is
suggestive (Barrett 2006b, 48).
Since core affect is a combination of valence and arousal, this hypothesis appears to suggest
three things. Firstly, that valence is a natural kind. Secondly, that arousal is a natural kind.
Thirdly, that the combination of valence and arousal – core affect - is a natural kind. In the
subsequent sections of this chapter, I will argue that valence is not likely to be a natural kind
(4.1.2), that arousal is not likely to be a natural kind (4.1.3), and that core affect is not likely to
be a natural kind (4.1.4). In 4.1.5 I will argue that even though core affect may not be a natural
kind, four potential candidates for natural kind status can be located in subsets of core affect.
4.1.2- Is Valence a Natural Kind?
Valence, as represented by the horizontal axis of the circumplex, ranges on a continuum
from positive to negative. In order to claim that valence is a natural kind it would need to be the
case that all instances ranging from positively to negatively valenced would tend to share a
family of co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their
co-occurrence non-accidentally. As I will demonstrate below, the empirical evidence does not
support the case that the class of all valenced states constitutes a natural kind. The evidence
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supports splitting valence into two groups corresponding to the extremes of the valence
continuum: positive valence and negative valence. Contra Barrett, the empirical evidence
suggests that positive valence and negative valence may constitute distinct natural kinds (I will
return to the consequences of this point in 4.1.4 and 4.1.5).
The empirical evidence provided below will suggest that there are diverse causal
mechanisms underlying positive valence and negative valence. If this is the case, then valence
does not fulfill requirement 2. There also appear to be distinct properties clustered around each
type of valence, showing that valence does not fulfill requirement 1 either. Thus, valence does
not seem to meet the requirements for natural kindhood because it is too heterogeneous and does
not conform to the causal structure of the world. It should be noted that the scientific studies I am
about to discuss contrast these two extremes and the properties that are measured are thus
relational.41 I will begin by looking at the evidence for a cluster or properties for valence and
then examine the empirical data for a causal mechanism for valence.
4.1.2.1- Shared Properties?
There are four contrastive pairs of properties that are associated with positive valence and
negative valence and thus not with valence as an entire class. These properties involve facial
expressions, physiological distinctness, behaviors, and effects on the health of subjects. The
shared properties fulfill requirement 1, but only for the extremes of valence and not for valence
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I would like to briefly remind the reader of the methodology employed in these studies that was discussed in 3.2
and emphasize that these extremes (positive and negative valence/high and low arousal (discussed in the preceding
section) are contrasted. Most of the studies use facial expressions or other pictures that are emotionally salient
(either production-based studies or perception-based studies), measure certain data, and correlate these findings with
self-reports in order to ensure that the subjects agree that the pictures represent the specific emotion state that they
are supposed to represent. For example, subjects may be asked to view pictures depicting negative emotional
expressions or states and positive emotional expressions or states. The measured data collected is correlated with
self-reports and contrasted between positive and negative emotionally relevant states. For example, while viewing a
negative emotional expression blood pressure increases in subjects in relation to the blood pressure of subjects
viewing positive emotional expressions. Thus the reader should keep in mind that these properties are all relational
properties. The same applies to high and low arousal states.
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as a class. So there appears to be evidence that positive valence may be a natural kind and that
negative valence may be another natural kind. I will now consider evidence which suggests this
split of the valence category into two distinct natural kinds.
First, production-based facial studies have consistently shown that positively valenced
emotions and negatively valenced emotions activate different facial muscles. Positively valenced
emotions elicit more activation in the cheek region, specifically increased zygomatic (smile
muscle) activity, as measured by facial electromyogram (EMGs).42 In contrast, the same
production-based facial studies have consistently shown that negatively valenced emotions show
increased activation in the brow area (Cacioppo et al. 2000, 178-179) and the corrugator (frown)
muscle. These heterogeneous and contrasting properties for positive valence and negative
valence are observed while subjects are thinking about past experiences (i.e., in production-based
studies) and while viewing pictures of positive emotional expressions (i.e., in perception-based
studies) (Fridlund et al. 1984; Lang et al. 1993; Schwartz et al. 1980. For a review of the
empirical studies see Cacioppo et al. 2000, 177-179). Production-based studies on infants show
the same diverse facial muscle activation for positively valenced and negatively valenced
emotions during emotionally salient stimuli. One study looked at infant cry-faces and infant
smile-faces (Messinger 2002). Messinger found that the same facial muscles that are activated in
adults are activated in infants. That is, cry-faces elicit more activation in the corrugator muscle
and smile-faces elicit more activation in the zygomatic muscle. These diverse activations for
positively valenced facial expressions and negatively valenced facial expressions, seen both in
adults and infants, suggest that valence as a class is too heterogeneous to constitute a natural
kind. Each type of valence appears to have its own distinct observable properties, in terms of
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EMGs record electrical currents associated with muscle contractions. Scientists have detailed maps of the facial
muscles. See Ekman 1976.
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facial expressions. So, just as there is no face of anger, there is no face of a valenced state
simpliciter. At most the evidence suggests that there may be a face of a negatively valenced state
and another face of a positively valenced state.
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that physical distinctness, defines as reactions in
the autonomic nervous system, is only found at the extremes of positive valence and negative
valence (not the entire class of valence). For example, during viewings of pictures that express
positively valenced emotions, there is a general decrease in autonomic nervous system activity
(Cacioppo et al. 2000, 183), although greater peak heart rate acceleration has been observed
(Bradley and Lang 2000).43 In contrast, the same studies found that there is greater autonomic
activity when subjects view pictures representative of negatively valenced emotions, combined
with significant heart rate deceleration. Notice that, as we saw above in the case of facial
expressions, autonomic nervous system reactions and measurements in cases of negative versus
positive valence form a contrastive pair. Once again, it seems that positively-valenced and
negatively-valenced states are too heterogeneous to form a single natural kind.
Other studies on the distinctness of valence show similarly diverse reactions. When
scientists measure blink responses in subjects viewing pictures of positively valenced emotional
states, the number of blink responses decreases and quicker eye blinks are recorded (Lang et al.
1993; Bradley and Lang 2000). Again, the same studies show a contrastive reaction in the eye
movements of subjects viewing pictures depicting negatively valenced emotional states. When
subjects view pictures of negative expressions, the number of blink responses increases and
slower eye blinks are recorded. Again, the evidence suggests that the properties are contrastive
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Bradley and Lang (2000) note that “as an index of emotional state, cardiac rate is less straightforward than other
psychological measures.” See page 258 of their article for a detailed discussion of this point.

50
between negative and positive valence. There are no characteristic properties of valence as a
class.
Third, subjects exhibit distinct behavioral reactions to positively valenced emotions and
different behavioral reactions to negatively valenced emotions. For example, one study found
that subjects rate pictures depicting positive emotional states as more interesting than pictures
depicting negative emotional states (Lang et al. 1993). The same study observed that, despite
this, subjects chose to view the pictures depicting positive states in shorter time periods and the
pictures depicting negative states for longer time periods. Other studies have found that subjects
shown pictures depicting negative emotional states show greater attention to them than to
pictures depicting positive emotional states (Pratto and John 1991; Hansen and Hansen 1988).
This means that subjects exhibit more orienting behaviors to pictures of negative emotional
states than to pictures of positive emotional states. Once again, it appears that the properties do
not cluster for valence as a class, but for the extremes of the continuum.
Fourth, there are increased health benefits associated with positively valenced emotions
and decreased health benefits associated with negatively valenced emotions. Many studies have
found that individuals who describe experiencing mostly positively valenced emotions in their
daily lives live longer than those who report experiencing mostly negatively valenced emotions
(e.g. Swenson et al., 1973; Herbert & Cohen, 1993; Kiecolt-Glaser et al, 1996; Lyubomirsky et
al., 2005; Maruta et al., 2000). A study that examined the diaries of nuns, looking for positive
and negative emotional terms, found that those who used more positive terms lived longer than
those who used more negative terms (Danner et al., 2001). Another study found that the way
men described bad emotional experiences (either in positive or negative terms), predicted their
future health states. They found that those who described their experiences in positive terms

51
were healthier later in life than those who described their experiences in negative terms (Peterson
et al., 1998). In a meta-review of the relation between positively valenced emotions and health
benefits, Lyubomirsky et al. conclude that “our review of the cross-sectional empirical literature
suggests that happiness [defined as positive valence] is positively correlated with indicators of
superior mental and physical health” (2005, 825). One more time, the evidence suggests that
there are contrasting health benefits for the extremes of valence.
To summarize, the empirical evidence from facial expression studies, physical
distinctness, behaviors, and effects on health implies that valence is too heterogeneous to be a
natural kind sensu Boyd. Even though ‘valenced states’ is not a homogenous kind, the classes of
‘negatively valenced’ and ‘positively valenced’ states may be. If X is positively valenced, X will
tend to promote health effects, activate certain facial muscles, result in distinct behaviors, and
have signature responses in the body. On the other hand, if X is negatively valenced, X will tend
to promote negative health effects, activate certain (distinct) facial muscles, result in distinct
behaviors, and have signature responses in the body. In sum, the evidence suggests there is one
cluster of properties associated with positive valence, and another, distinct, even contrastive
cluster of properties associated with negative valence. But a cluster of properties is only half of
the story for being a natural kind a la Boyd. The key to a homeostatic property cluster is a causal
mechanism. I now turn to examine the empirical evidence for a causal mechanism underlying
valence.
4.1.2.2- Shared Causal Mechanism?
Empirical data suggests that there are different causal (homeostatic) mechanisms for
positive valence and negative valence. As I will show, these causal (homeostatic) mechanisms
appear to be contrastive, just as the properties above were. So there do appear to be reasons to
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think that positive and negative valence fulfill requirement 2, but not the entire class of valenced
states. Once more, valence appears to be too heterogeneous to form a natural kind, but the
extremes may constitute natural kinds.
In emotion theory the assumption is that a causal mechanism for emotions will be found
in the brain. We lack robust empirical evidence concerning causal mechanisms for positive
valence and negative valence, but it should be noted that discrete emotion theorists have likewise
failed to find strong correlations between individual types of discrete emotions and specific
processes in the brain. Even though there is not a distinct brain area that we can call the causal
mechanism for positive valence and negative valence, there is some general evidence that we can
point to. Many studies have correlated positive valence with increased left-hemisphere activation
and negative valence with increased activation in the right hemisphere. Cacioppo et al. states that
most studies have found that “the left anterior region of the brain appears to be involved in the
expression and experience of approach-related emotion [positive valence], and the right anterior
region appears to be involved in the expression and experience of avoidance-related emotions
[negative valence]” (2000, 185). The evidence for diverse causal mechanisms for positive and
negative valence suggests that all valenced states are too heterogeneous to constitute a natural
kind, but these extremes may be homogenous enough.
For example, a number of studies using electroencephalographic (EEG)44 recordings of
subjects during viewings of emotionally salient film clips have found that positive reactions (as
indicated by self-reports) to positively valenced films are correlated with activity in the lefthemisphere. The same studies found that negative reactions to negatively valenced films were
correlated with right-hemisphere activation (Cacioppo et al. 2000). Additionally, clinical
observations (Robinson et al. 1984; Robinson & Downhill 1995) and experimental research
44

EEGs record electrical activity in the brain by using sensors, called electrodes, attached to the subject’s head.
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suggest that individual differences in the activation of the left-hemisphere result in a
predisposition to experience positive emotions and individual differences in the activation of the
right-hemisphere result in a predisposition to experience negative emotions (Cacioppo et al.
2000, 185). Clinical observations also support the right lateralization for negatively valenced
emotions. One study found that a patient who had undergone a right temporal lobectomy
responded just as a normal patient would to positive stimuli, but not to negative stimuli (Morris
et al. 1991).45 While these are extremely general, they at least point to diverse causal
mechanisms.
Given the current empirical data the most that we can say is that increased activation in
the left-hemisphere appears to be correlated with positive valence, and increased activation in the
right-hemisphere appears to be correlated with negative valence. Even though the evidence does
not show a robust causal mechanism for either positive valence or negative valence, it does
suggest that there may be diverse causal mechanisms for the class of valence. Thus, it appears
that all valenced states do not fulfill requirement 2 for natural kindhood, but the extremes of
positive and negative may fulfill this requirement. I will now examine the evidence for the
natural kind status of the other dimension of core affect: arousal.
4.1.3- Is Arousal a Natural Kind?
Arousal, as represented along the vertical axis of the circumplex, is a continuum from high
levels to low levels. I now consider the hypothesis that all aroused states (ranging from high to
low) tend to share a family of often co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic)
mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence non-accidentally. I will suggest that the
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This was found not only in measurements while the subject was viewing negative pictures, but also was reported
by the patient’s family and friends.
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evidence points to a split within the arousal dimension, analogously to the case of valence. The
evidence suggests that high arousal and low arousal may be distinct natural kinds.
It should be noted that it is difficult to evaluate the natural kind status of arousal. There are
several reasons for this. First, it is difficult to precisely define “arousal” as I argued in section
2.3. Arousal is most often thought of and measured by reactions in the autonomic nervous
system, but the effects of the autonomic nervous system are far-ranging. Due to the far-ranging
effects, it seems that there may be alternative explanations for these visceral properties that need
to be eliminated. Barrett admits to this: “Patterns of autonomic and somatic responses relate in
some way to feeling active and alert, slowed down and sleepy, or angry or sad, but there is no
simple, one-to-one correspondence” (2004b, 685). It is important for scientists to keep in mind
that if they want to find natural kinds they need to precisify their terms. According to Boyd,
“natural kinds are solutions…to problems about how to sort things so as to facilitate reliable
induction and explanation” (1999, 72). In order to accomplish this, the categories must be
revised to fit the causal structure of the world. Second, there are few studies solely on arousal,
whereas there are a plethora of studies on valence. Lastly, there are problems with identifying a
causal mechanism for arousal.
The empirical evidence which is available suggests that the entire class of arousal is not a
natural kind. Similarly to valence, arousal appears to split into two possible natural kinds (the
extremes): high arousal and low arousal. The evidence I elucidate below suggests that there are
clusters of distinct properties for high and low arousal, but not for the entire class of arousal.
Therefore, arousal does not fulfill requirement 1. The evidence for a causal mechanism
underlying arousal is sketchy at best, but I will suggest that there are reasons to think that there
may be two underlying causal mechanisms in the category. Therefore, arousal does not appear to
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fulfill requirement 2. Again, I will return to what this might imply about the natural kind status
of core affect in 4.1.4 and 4.1.5.
4.1.3.1- Shared Properties?
There appear to be at least three contrastive pairs of properties for high arousal and low
arousal, but no properties shared by the entire class. These properties are facial expressions,
physical distinctness, and behaviors. These properties support requirement 1 for natural
kindhood, but only for the extremes: high arousal and low arousal. I will present the empirical
evidence for each of these properties below.
First, there is evidence that when a positively or negatively valenced emotion is viewed the
level of tension in the relevant facial muscle group is related to the level of arousal. In other
words, higher levels of arousal correspond to greater tension in the relevant muscles, depending
on whether the emotion is positively or negatively valenced (Cacioppo et al. 1986). In particular,
zygomatic (smile muscle) activity increases as arousal increases in viewings of emotionally
positive pictures (Lang et al. 1993). Cacioppo et al. conclude that “the present research indicates
that facial EMG activity varies as a function of…the intensity of affective reactions” (1986, 266).
Messinger (2002) believes that his data on facial expression in infants also indicate that high
arousal corresponds to stronger contraction of the associated facial muscles. These empirical data
seem to indicate that high levels and low levels of arousal have characteristic effects that are
contrastive and therefore arousal as a whole is too heterogeneous to be a natural kind.
Second, there is evidence that physiological responses are distinct for levels of arousal.
For example, skin conductance responses determined by activity in the sweat glands increase as
arousal increases, regardless of whether the emotionally salient pictures are rated as positive or
negative (Lang et al. 1993; Bernstein 1969; Maltzman et al. 1971; Bradley et al. 1990; Cook et
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al. 1991; Greenwald et al. 1989; Manning & Melchiori 1974; Winton et al. 1984). In other
words, subjects produce more sweat when highly aroused and less sweat when they are in states
of low arousal. Lang et at. conclude that “skin conductance response increased monotonically
with ranked arousal” (1003, 265). Again, there appear to be contrastive properties associated
with levels of arousal.
Third, there are distinct behavioral responses correlated with high arousal and contrasting
responses to low arousal. For example, measures of attention, leading to orienting behaviors, are
related primarily to arousal levels (Lang et al. 1993). Subjects tend to exhibit orienting behaviors
to highly arousing emotional stimuli. Additionally, Bradley et al (1992) showed that memory is
better for pictures that are rated as highly arousing.46 Gold and McGaugh’s (1975) study also
supports the claim that memory increases for highly arousing stimuli. Gold and McGaugh
manipulated arousal levels in animal subjects and showed that they also demonstrated better
memory of training stimuli when the arousal levels were high. These properties are once again
clustered around the extremes of arousal and not arousal as a whole. Even though arousal states
are not homogeneous, high arousal and low arousal may be. In sum, the limited empirical data
suggest that the extremes of arousal may each be associated with a distinct cluster of properties
and may therefore be natural kinds. Again, the causal (homeostatic) mechanism is key and so I
turn to that requirement below.
4.1.3.2- Shared Causal Mechanism?
Causal mechanisms related to arousal are much more difficult to distinguish, but given
what was said in the previous section, it seems likely that there are (at least) two distinct causal
mechanisms at work in the category of arousal. One study did find that a patient who had
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It should be noted that this is not the case for pathologically fearful subjects. When these subjects are highly
aroused they have poor memories.
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portions of the right amygdala removed consistently reported lower arousal levels (Bradley and
Lang 2000, 259). So it might be the case that the right hemisphere is correlated with arousal, but
this is a tentative conclusion.
The problem with finding a causal mechanism might be attributed to the fact that
scientists are not looking for the right kind of causal mechanism. Causal mechanisms are
assumed to be found in regions or areas in the brain, but there may be good reasons to think that
this will not be the case for arousal. All of the measurable effects associated with arousal involve
visceral properties and the effects are diverse and widespread. Given such diverse effects it
seems unlikely that one brain area or region would be correlated with arousal. It may be the case
that scientists need to search for a causal mechanism for arousal at a different level of analysis.
Perhaps the causal mechanism for arousal is better thought of as a change in hormone levels or
neurotransmitters. Further empirical research needs to be done, but if clusters of properties are
indicative of an underlying causal mechanism (this is usually assumed to be the case), then in all
likelihood there are different causal mechanism for high and low arousal.
To summarize, the limited empirical data suggest that arousal is too heterogeneous to be
a natural kind. Instead, homogeneity appears at the extremes of high arousal and low arousal. If
X is a high arousal state, then X will tend to exhibit increased tension in facial muscles,
increased production in the sweat glands, and orientating behavior. On the other hand, if X is a
low arousal state, then X will tend to exhibit decreased tension in facial muscles, decreased
production in the sweat glands, and less orientating behavior. Thus, high arousal and low arousal
may both constitute natural kinds, but the evidence suggests that arousal as an entire class does
not.
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4.1.4- Is Core Affect a Natural Kind?
I have now evaluated whether valence and arousal are natural kinds. Could it be the case
that core affect (the combination of valence and arousal) may be a natural kind? In order for core
affect to be a natural kind all instances ranging from positive valence-low arousal to positive
valence-high arousal to negative valence-low arousal to negative valence-high arousal would
have to tend to share a family of co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism
that brings about their co-occurrence non-accidentally. In other words, it would have to be the
case that core affect fulfilled requirements 1 and 2 for natural kind status. Under this view, the
circumplex as a whole would constitute a visual representation of a natural kind.
As was shown in the previous two sections of this chapter, both valence and arousal are too
heterogeneous to be natural kinds. There are distinct contrastive properties corresponding to the
extremes of valence and arousal. It seems to follow that core affect is most likely not a natural
kind because combining the heterogeneity of valence and arousal leads to even more
heterogeneity. For example, instances of negatively valenced-highly aroused states are associated
with an increase in autonomic activity and orientating behavior, whereas instances of positively
valenced- low aroused states are associated with a decreases in autonomic activity and a lack of
orientating behavior. These are heterogeneous properties that cannot be attributed to core affect
as part of the natural property cluster. Decreased health benefits associated with negative valence
and increased health benefits associated with positive valence is another heterogeneous property
of core affect. Several other heterogeneous properties associated with the core affect category
were discussed in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Thus, there is not a family of often co-occurring
properties for core affect and core affect fails to fulfill requirement 1 for a natural kind sensu
Boyd. Likewise there are multiple causal mechanisms associated with core affect. For example,
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right-hemisphere activation is associated with negative valence and left-hemisphere activation is
associated with positive valence. Thus core affect fails to fulfill requirement 2.
To answer the question of this thesis (and this chapter): No, core affect is not a natural kind.
The properties exhibited by core affective states are too heterogeneous for the entire class of core
affect to form a natural kind. Under the view that the set of all core affective states is a natural
kind the entire circumplex is a visual representation of a single natural kind. This is not the case.
If any natural kinds are visually represented on the circumplex (i.e. if core affect remains a
fruitful methodology for studying the emotions), then they must be sub-regions of the
circumplex. In fact, empirical data appear to support the hypothesis that subsets of core affect are
natural kinds.
4.1.5- Are Subsets of Core Affect Natural Kinds?
Even though core affect may not be a natural kind, there is a sense in which Barrett’s key
hypothesis may be correct- certain sets of core affective states are likely natural kinds. Core
affective states are varied combinations of valence and arousal levels. The empirical evidence
supports the hypothesis that the set of states corresponding to the four quadrants of the
circumplex are natural kinds. That is, four subsets of core affective states appear to be natural
kinds: the set of negatively valenced- high arousal states, the set of positively valenced- high
arousal states, the set of negatively valenced- low arousal states, and the set of positively
valenced- low arousal states. These four seem to fulfill requirements 1 and 2 for natural kind
status. This claim is a consequence of the evidence presented in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Table 1
below compiles all of the data provided in these previous sections. The table maps directly onto
the four quadrants of the circumplex. I strongly encourage the reader to compare table 1 to the
core affective circumplex on page 10.
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Table 1
Negative Valence/High Arousal
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1):
Increased activation in brow area and corrugator
(frown) facial muscle (in adults and infants) (-V)
Increased tension in corrugator (frown) facial
muscle ( ↑ A)
General increase in autonomic nervous system
activity, but significant heart rate deceleration (V)
Increased production in sweat glands ( ↑ A)
Increase in number of blink responses and shorter
eye blinks (-V)
Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures less
interesting, but choose to view them in longer
time periods (-V)
Subjects attend more to emotionally salient
pictures (-V)
Allocation of more attention to emotionally salient
picture- Orientating behavior towards moreIncreased memory allocation ( ↑ A)
Decreased health benefits, such as shorter life
spans and worse overall mental and physical
health (-V)
Possible Causal Mechanism (Requirement 2):
In general, more right-hemisphere activation (V)

Positive Valence/ High Arousal
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Negative Valence/Low Arousal
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1):
Increased activation in brow area and corrugator
(frown) facial muscle (in adults and infants) (-V)
Less tension in brow area and corrugator (frown)
facial muscle (↓ A)
General increase in autonomic nervous system
activity, but significant heart rate deceleration (V)
Decreased production in sweat glands (↓ A)
Increase in number of blink responses and shorter
eye blinks (-V)
Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures less
interesting, but choose to view them in longer
time periods (-V)
Subjects attend more to emotionally salient
pictures (-V)
Allocation of less attention to emotionally salient
picture- Lack of orientating behavior ----Decreased memory allocation (↓ A)
Decreased health benefits, such as shorter life
spans and worse overall mental and physical
health (-V)
Possible Causal Mechanism (Requirement 2):
In general, more right-hemisphere activation
(-V)

Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1):
Increased activation in zygomatic (smile) facial
muscle (in adults and infants) (+V)
Increased tension in zygomatic (smile) facial
muscle ( ↑ A)
General decrease in autonomic nervous system
activity, but greater peak heart rate acceleration
(+V)
Increased production in sweat glands ( ↑ A)
Decrease in number of blink responses and
quicker eye blinks (+V)
Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures more
interesting, but choose to view then in shorter
time periods (+V)
Subjects attend less to emotionally salient pictures
(+V)
Allocation of more attention to emotionally salient
pictures- Orientating behavior- Increased memory
allocation ( ↑ A)
Increased health benefits, such as longevity and
better overall mental and physical health (+V)

Possible Causal Mechanism (Requirement 2):
In general, more left-hemisphere activation (+V)

Positive Valence/Low Arousal
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Cluster of Properties (Requirement 1):
Increased activation in zygomatic (smile) facial
muscle (in adults and infants) (+V)
Less tension in zygomatic (smile) facial muscle (↓
A)
General decrease in autonomic nervous system
activity, but greater peak heart rate acceleration
(+V)
Decreased production in sweat glands (↓ A)
Decrease in number of blink responses and
quicker eye blinks (+V)
Subjects rate emotionally salient pictures more
interesting, but choose to view then in shorter
time periods (+V)
Subjects attend less to emotionally salient pictures
(+V)
Allocation of less attention to emotionally salient
picture- Lack of orientating behavior (↓ A)Decreased memory allocation (↓ A)
Increased health benefits, such as longevity and
better overall mental and physical health (+V)

Possible Causal Mechanism (Requirement 2):
In general, more left-hemisphere activation (+V)
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In light of the evidence there seem to be four natural kinds. That is, negative valence/high
arousal, positive valence/high arousal, negative valence/low arousal, and negative valence/high
arousal all appear to share their own a family of co-occurring properties and a causal
(homeostatic) mechanism that brings about their co-occurrence non-accidentally. For example,
the set of positively valenced and low arousal states is associated with increased activation in the
zygomatic (smile) facial muscle, a general decrease in autonomic activity, lack of orientating
behavior, and more left-hemisphere activation. From this information, scientists may be able to
reliably predict that these properties will be observed when a subject is either viewing a picture
rated as positively valenced and low arousal or experiencing this core affective state. Thus, the
set of positively valenced and low arousal states would seem to support some preliminary
generalizations.
It should also be noted that in so far as discrete emotions can be plotted on the
circumplex they are likewise amenable to generalizations phrased in terms of valence and
arousal. Since fear, anger, and disgust map onto the negative valence/high arousal quadrant of
the circumplex, we can expect them to be associated with increased activation and tension in the
corrugator (frown) facial muscle, orientating behavior, a general increase in autonomic activity,
and more right-hemisphere activation. Thus, preliminary generalizations and predictions retain
the basicness of valence and arousal, and apply to some discrete emotions.
The claim that there may be four subsets of core affective states that are natural kinds is
an empirical hypothesis and so is revisable in light of further empirical data. In fact, we should
expect that these proposed four natural kinds will be revised. At present we have only a
rudimentary understanding of the causal mechanisms. We can localize a causal mechanism for
positive valence somewhere in the left-hemisphere and for negative valence somewhere in the
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right-hemisphere. The causal mechanism is even less clear for arousal. Generalizations and
predictions will become more powerful as we gain a further understanding of the causal
mechanisms underlying these natural kinds.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
To summarize, I have explained a new and interesting theory of the emotions: core affect
(Ch.2). I then presented Barrett’s arguments against the natural kind status of discrete emotions
and in favor of the natural kind status of core affect (Ch.3). I then argued that while core affect is
likely not a natural kind, four subsets of core affective states (negative valence/high arousal,
positive valence/high arousal, negative valence/low arousal, and positive valence/low arousal)
may be natural kinds (Ch.4). The empirical evidence presented in table 1 supports my argument:
there is a family of often co-occurring properties and a causal (homeostatic) mechanism that
brings about the co-occurrence non-accidentally for each of these subsets of core affect. Thus,
there appear to be four natural kinds within the core affective category. I would like to end with a
brief discussion of what I think core affect can add to emotion theory and a general lesson for
emotion theorists looking for natural kinds: splitting proposed kinds is the best avenue for
discovering natural kinds.
As I previously mentioned, the dominant paradigm in emotion theory is the discrete emotion
approach and the central concern has been locating natural kinds of discrete emotions. I think
that there is something that discrete emotion theorists can take from this notion of splitting core
affect and the tentative correlation between arousal and valence. One of the main reasons Barrett
claims that the discrete emotions are not natural kinds is because they assume that folk categories
of emotions, such as “anger,” must corresponds to a scientific category, anger. Typically folk
terms must be refined so as to fit the causal structure of the world. The discrete emotion theorists
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seem to have forgotten that in order to find a natural kind we must fit our terms to the causal
structure of the world (for a similar argument see Griffiths 2004a). Perhaps it is time for discrete
emotion theorists to take seriously Russell’s suggestion that arousal levels may distinguish a
number discrete emotions that are otherwise difficult to separate scientifically (such as sadness,
disgust, contempt, anger).
A similar moral ought to be drawn by core affect theorists. Even when we start with
“scientific” terms or concepts, we still may need to revise them in light of empirical data. Our
goal is to make our terms fit the causal structure of the world if we want to find natural kinds
sensu Boyd. Core affect theorists appear to be right that valence and arousal are important in
understanding the emotions, but their own research suggests that core affect is not a natural kind.
The evidence suggests that core affect needs to be further refined if it is to be scientifically
fruitful as a natural kind.
Several philosophical points follow from my tentative conclusion that there are four potential
natural kinds within the core affective category. First, it may often be the case that splitting a
proposed kind is more likely to yield natural kinds. Second, philosophy has more to offer
scientists than just conceptual analysis. Of course this is an important part of philosophy of
science. I have pointed to several problems with the core affect theory (see chapter 2). But what
my tentative conclusion shows is that philosophy can also contribute and direct future scientific
research by a careful analysis not only of the theory, but also of the empirical data. Given my
conclusion further research on the core affective category should focus on the extremes of the
dimensions and further correlating these extremes. Thus, philosophy can assist in directing
scientific research not only by arm chair analysis or by using anecdotal evidence in arguments,
but also by getting our hands dirty and really analyzing the available evidence.
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In conclusion, the best shot at locating natural kinds is empirically reformed revisions of
the category. In the case of core affect, the category appears to need to be split. Four subsets of
core affect are likely natural kinds. That is, the set of negative valence-high arousal states may be
a natural kind, as well as each of the other three core affective states corresponding to the
quadrants of the circumplex. It may also be the case that some of the discrete emotions need to
be split, perhaps on the basis of differing arousal levels. If we are after natural kinds, then we
must fit our categories to what Boyd calls the sometimes messy and complex causal structure of
the world (1991, 143). This may inevitably mean splitting what we thought before was a natural
kind. This is surely a small price to pay for the potential consequence of finding new categories
suitable for scientific study and analysis.
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